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ABSTRACT 
 
Can Regionalism Provide Stabilization to Central Asia and thus 
Afghanistan? Richard 
Alexander Good 
 
 
 
This research was undertaken as there is a gap in the current academic 
realm, in which Central Asia and Afghanistan were heavily referenced, but none 
which went a step further and critically analyzed a new regionalism which would 
tie Afghanistan and Central Asia together bilaterally and multilaterally, whilst also 
deciphering through analysis, theory, and practice, the most suitable type of 
regionalism to be employed to achieve stability in Central Asia and thus 
Afghanistan. 
 
There is much discussion on regionalism as a standalone product and 
theory, and little on the formulation of a new regional body, one which can 
provide the framework for a unique type of forum which is necessary for Central 
Asia. Inclusiveness, openness, non-judgmentalism, and building links through 
trade, security, and development across the board where the main issues to be 
researched in order to find a more perfect union for the region, one which could 
offer hope, change, and a radical departure from the failed techniques of the status 
quo, following the ASEAN method. The methodology employed in the research 
included the case study method and historical analysis. These forms of research in 
themselves provide a solid foundation to answer the research questions in order to 
formulate the most likely form of regionalism needed to be employed to 
accomplish stability in Central Asia, including proposing the radical notion of 
strong man politics or illiberal regionalism. 
 
The results were that cooperation on many levels from the grassroots up to 
the highest echelons of government were necessary for cooperation between 
Central Asian states. Key areas of common concern were identified, and 
cooperation based upon these has the probability to spur further cooperation and 
integration needed to work towards a regionalist model with the goal of stabilizing 
and growing prosperity and development in Central Asia and Afghanistan, the 
implications of which are self-evident and self-proving. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
Analytical Framework, Methodology, and Chapter Outline 
 
The aim of this research into Central Asia, the region’s economic progress, 
security situation, and the effects of wider regionalism is to critically examine the 
internal and international relations of the region in order to put forward a better model 
for constructive development of the region, seen through a broader perspective as a 
 
whole and not just as individual nation states. The research into development of the 
 
Central Asian region is necessary in order to identify key goals and needs for Central 
 
Asia’s post-Afghan war future, and to attempt to devise a regional scheme for stability, 
 
based upon mutual goals and considerations of neighbouring and distant states. In order 
 
to accomplish this research, the study will focus on the case study of the politics and 
 
relations of the Central Asian states and their client state relations (Russia, China, USA, 
 
Pakistan) taken as a whole with a top down view focusing on Central Asia and the 
 
statecraft of that region. That is to say, the case study will focus on Central Asia and 
 
Afghanistan in order to ascertain which model of regionalism is most suitable. 
 
 
It can be said that Afghanistan should be viewed through a specific scope within 
the Central Asia region, as it is an inherently unstable state, which threatens the stability 
of its neighbours through trickle down effects of having a non-functioning state. It can 
also be said that if Afghanistan becomes the foci of regional efforts then its potential 
stability could be a transformative event for the region at large and could help the region 
keep outside influence at bay. It should also be noted that these states have competing 
interests and agendas and if common ground is not identified, the states of Central Asia 
can work against each other and themselves, stalling progress in economics and security 
and another implosion of the regions civil society, as well as an extremist resurgence. I 
put forth, that the latter is not something any of these states wish to see come to fruition 
2 
 
as instability is a plague which could strike any state at any time. It would be far more 
constructive to find common needs and goals and to cooperate to see mutual success. 
According to The Diplomat, most conversation in Central Asia in geopolitics surrounds 
the influence of Russia and China in parallel with economic and cooperation reforms in 
Central Asia
1
. The author, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also infers that Central Asian leaders like 
to tend to focus on terrorism and transitional crime as distractors for domestic politics. 
 
This provides a conduit to introduce the concept of strong man politics, which are 
 
seeing something of resurgence in Central Asia and which may indeed provide a ‘third 
choice’ for the region2. This concept is not without flaw, as the concept itself is subject 
to rapid change, however, it does offer a potential additional option to analyse which 
may be a complimentary extreme for the region based on the research conducted. 
Although there exist many studies on the state of affairs individually in 
Afghanistan, it’s neighbour Pakistan, and the other key Central Asian states, there is to 
date currently little research, which fully and purposely ties together the national 
interests of the nations of Central Asia for the purposes of creating a regional solution to 
regional volatility. The research question is thus; can a new wave of regionalism fit a 
 
realist future for Central Asia. This work will focus a great deal on security theory 
 
through both security community theory, and through neo-realist eyes as a power game 
 
in the unpredictable international system. Regionalism and all the associated theory 
 
which surrounds the topic shall be the main devise to be explored alongside non 
 
judgmentalism, and strong man theory in regards to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The 
need for a study in depth on regionalism and the new concept of a regional model 
incorporating Pakistan, as well as other key neighbours with shared interests, is 
fundamental to the long-term stability of Afghanistan and the region at large. Because 
 
1 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/paul-stronski-on-central-asias-big-questions/ 
2 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/22/a-perfect-storm-in-central-asia/ 
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the stability of Central Asia is linked to global security, particularly militant Islamic 
movements, an unstable and fragile Central Asia poses a direct threat to world security. 
This is due to the close nexus of the regional states: semi-porous borders and common 
threats have ripple effects across the Pakistani, Chinese, Turkmen, Tajik, Iranian, and 
Uzbek borders into and out of Afghanistan. 
 
Conversely, any progress in inter-state relations that can be made with bordering 
states in key areas such as the economy, development and security provide a more solid 
footing for the central government, and in theory project the legitimacy and sovereignty 
of the Kabul regime, thus helping abate or defeat or compromise with the Taliban 
movement at the grass roots level. 
 
As there is currently no totally inclusive, concrete international organization or 
strategy, which provides a comprehensive mechanism to cooperate on transnational 
issues and national stability in Central Asia, It may be a likely possibility that the Kabul 
central government, will not likely survive without a foreign security presence. This is 
due to a weak central government, poor representation in the provinces, lack of trust, 
corruption and perceived or actual weakness and dependency on western security and 
money. As such, it is imperative that these areas of weakness be addressed head on, by 
the government directly and also in concert with neighbouring governments, ideally 
through a regional body which can direct and oversee actions, preserve sovereignty and 
regulate as well as provide checks and balances to multilateral power in the region. If 
Central Asia is viewed as a whole then the stability needed in Afghanistan can also be 
seen as necessary across the board, and indeed, the regional states do fear fallout from 
Afghanistan and seek to prevent it in order to either bolster their own security or to 
prevent such anarchy from spreading to their own sovereign territory. By linking the 
region, and creating and encouraging ties, regionalism can aid in the structuring and 
future development of the region on a great variety of matters. 
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Historically Afghanistan has been linked intrinsically to Pakistan, as the people, 
the politics, and the outside influences share a commonality, which binds the two states. 
The two are seemingly linked and their mutual fates intertwined and inseparable, much 
like the ethnic and linguistic as well as religious ties the two states share. This new 
reality of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations (AF-PAK) must be explored and the mutual 
power harnessed for good, in order to find the correct pathway to a new international 
organization for Central Asia. AF-PAK relations can be seen as a pivotal for wider 
central Asian Relations. This is because the interaction between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan reflects what the other states see. There are vested interests, risks and gains, 
common to the entire region and to explore these regional issues, AF-PAK must be 
analysed to its full extent. 
 
Looking to other regional bodies around the world, such as the European Union 
(EU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides a strong basis 
for belief in a development plan sanctioned by and implemented by a supranational 
body or association to help bring stability and prosperity to Central Asia. It is 
paramount to the thesis that acceptability to the region be understood. This allows a 
pathway to a regional organization in Central Asia. 
 
Much has been written on regional bodies and the United Nations (UN), but 
little relevant work has been published regarding a modern, totally inclusive, workable, 
regional solution for Central Asia, which would aid Afghanistan via aiding the entire 
region through common interest. The theory exists and will be incorporated with 
effective strategic modelling drawn from research in order to amalgamate predictive 
analytics with a workable model based on common themes and goals revealed in 
research. 
5 
 
In a multi-polar world and in an increasingly polarized and unstable region, one 
which borders and encompasses the former ‘Islamic state’, an organization which 
includes all the regional states of Central Asia must be formed to contain problems, 
fight terror and crime and support the statehood of all the nations and the citizens of 
central Asia, in order to unite for progress. The literature indicates that regionalism in 
its most general and smallest forms can exist in Central Asia. In fact, in terms of 
hierarchy, more inclusive forms of regionalism have sprouted in recent years, but none 
have gone that extra step to form a totally inclusive model. The ‘why’ to this equation 
must be solved in order to see how a model can be developed and put into place. 
 
The theory of neo-realism, which at its essence states that nations will do 
whatever they need to ensure their own survival, self-interest and goals are met, 
combined with structuralism, essentially can be interpreted to mean states can and will 
cooperate together in a pragmatic manor to accomplish their own goals via a 
community, is the main theme that is a constant throughout my research methodology 
and is the basis for my hypothesis and research questions. The rationale for such a 
theory is that it is pervasive in the literature and can be found prevalently throughout 
much of the established discourse in regionalism and Central Asia. Such theory is 
heavily present in the landmark works on security studies in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
by Barnett
3
, and is the strongest grounded theory available to apply to Afghanistan and 
the region for regional cooperation. A use of this theory in combination with a 
taxonomy and hierarchy of possible solutions will be analysed and discussed with 
regards to social science modelling in order to identify strong and weak points in 
regionalism so far in order to better answer the ‘why’ question. This taxonomy will also 
better predictably model the future of the region with a workable regional model being 
 
 
3   
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of 
Security Communities’, Ethics and International Affairs, 10 (1996), 64–100. 
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developed to account for the regional dichotomy between anarchy and regional and 
 
international organizations. 
 
 
Despite numerous studies which examine a variety of theories for stabilization 
 
including security community theory, democratic peace theory and hegemonic power 
 
and balancing, to name a few, there is a void of academic work on the specific topic of 
 
Afghan-central Asian relations focused on regional organizations as the end game of 
 
regional stability. That is not to say that there is not published debate on regionalism 
 
and Central Asia. Quite the contrary, as there are many works on this fundamental 
subject, as evidenced by the literature review. The issue is that the niche topic of 
comprehensively examining an international organization’s taxonomy and deciphering 
how various modes of international organizations could fit in Central Asia have not been 
exhausted. It is necessary to find the common factors that make regionalism work, and 
to apply these through the taxonomy to a functional model for Central Asia. The concept 
of total regional inclusiveness has been little examined, as has finding the 
channels to acceptable International Organizations in Central Asia, the ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
are what deserve real analysis, and only through examination of all the factors, 
international relations, and regional issues can the research hypothesis be answered. 
 
My hypothesis is based upon this visible gap in this sphere of strategic studies. My 
hypothesis is that without a new regional community, the Afghan state will collapse. It 
is a recognized fact that Afghanistan is weak; therefore enduring stability is a widely 
identified problem that Afghanistan and Central Asia will have after the main part of 
NATO forces leave Afghanistan. Using a study of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism, the 
future of Central Asia can be plotted in an attempt to use institutionalism to prevent a 
re-lapse into failed state status for Afghanistan and thus also avoiding destabilization of 
wider Central Asia. When examining the situation in Central Asia, economic 
dependence, market stagnation, lack of productivity, as well as transit and customs 
7 
 
barriers it becomes clear with traditional modern idealism advocated by Sir Alfred 
Zimmerman, Maynard Keynes, and Lester B. Pearson, that if Central Asia can culture a 
regional policy with other states which reflects what Central Asia needs, then economic 
growth and security may be achievable, this is in line with realist theory in that the self 
interest of the states can be fulfilled and in turn growth and security will be the by- 
products
4
 
 
 
Although idealist international relations theory can clash with realism, it can also be 
seen that both power and national interest can be harnessed alongside international 
legalism, and thus it is possible to examine the two theories side by side for the purpose 
of identifying national goals and needs in order to answer the research questions. The 
reason for this being that institutional liberalism and realism both are utilitarian and 
both rational, which is a logical fit for this project’s goals. This theoretical adaptation is 
the exact same model that Robert Keohane follows in much of his own discourse on 
international relations theory. Keohane is a realist; however he is pragmatic and 
explores multiple avenues in his analysis of international relations. This allows the 
research to not be skewed and prejudiced to only one inflexible point of view. 
 
Reflecting on past incarnations of regionalism and regional development (a 
regionalism case study), lessons learned in Europe, Africa and elsewhere in Asia, have 
the potential to be an aid to identifying the key factors of successful regionalism, and 
may help to classify international organizations as part of a hierarchy, in order to find 
out what level of integration would be appropriate for Afghanistan and Central Asia. 
Although it can be argued that the international system is anarchical in its nature
5 
, 
especially with the coming power vacuum which a post occupational Afghanistan will 
and is creating in the region, realist thinking and institution building can go hand-in- 
 
 
4 
Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and 
Peace, (Oxford, 2006), 3 
5 
Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (London, 1979). 
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hand in order to identify factors that feed the self-interest of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, China, and Iran and that of the regional powers and 
even the United States, India, and Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Methodology 
 
For this research undertaking many methodological methods were considered. 
 
However, the most suited for this particular type of social science research were 
 
narrowed down to one method. 
 
1)  Case study method of primary research with historical analysis, 
 
These research methods are, on their own, powerful means of measuring and 
critically assessing situations, common themes and recurring data patterns. With these 
methods combined though, the ability to better analyse events, politics and motives as 
well as beliefs and commitment to change is exponentially increased and even allows 
for predictive indications, all to better process the raw data and information for detailed 
analysis, to better contribute to the field and ‘fill the gap’ in the area of my research. 
 
During this research, these two methodologies will be co-dependant. As such, it is 
necessary to justify their purpose and usefulness to this research and to strategic studies 
and international relations theory in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Case Study Method 
 
The case study is a single in-depth examination of an event, or group (in this case: 
Operation Enduring Freedom, The Soviet War in Afghanistan and The Taliban, as well 
as the foreign policies and Afghan specific policies of Afghanistan’s neighbours, 
especially Pakistan, China, Iran, and Uzbekistan. The aim of the case study is to find 
9 
 
factors relevant to the context.
6 
Case studies are used as an explanatory devise to dig 
deep to find common factors to be applied to socio-political modelling in order to 
construct a regional organization. In order to identify these key underpinning factors, 
the root causes of events, or beliefs and actions of nation-states and people or groups, in 
order to better understand the motives and rationale for such action.
7 
These motives are 
all unique to the situations they belong in, however, the role international and regional 
organizations have played in response belies a common approach to a situation which 
can be reflected upon and fine-tuned for better targeted, acceptable regionalism in 
Central Asia. This research will primarily be following a joint perspective and 
retrospective approach. The joint perspective is an analysis of events/group behaviour 
fitting within defined areas of interest of critical importance to regionalism research on 
Afghanistan and Central Asia, as the events develop on a daily basis. The retrospective 
analysis will be seen when historical trends, factors and studies fit within the same pre- 
defined core areas of study for this research undertaking. Having the amalgamation of 
the two bands of study method will enrich the output and will allow for simplified 
identification of key common factors necessary to modelling, so that a qualitative model 
can be proposed based upon research findings and graphical interpolation of data 
uncovered. 
Rather than being inflexible and rigid like a pure statistic or mathematical study, the 
social science compatible case study allows various phenomena to be looked at through 
a perspective of defined theory. The factors are then compared to the hypothesis and 
analysed through the research questions within the defined parameters of study of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Baxter, P., and S. Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers’, The Qualitative Report 13/4 (2008), 544-559. 
7
,Jon Shepard and Robert W. Greene, Sociology and You, (Ohio, 2003), A–22. Robert K. Yin, Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods. (4th ed, California, 2009). 
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utmost relevance to finding the end goal of a regional solution to stability in Central 
 
Asia, by considering all factors both in a vacuum and together.
8
 
 
The flexibility of the case study innately allows for the facilitation of comparisons of 
data to hypothesis, which is ideal for this type of research project. The flexible nature of 
the case study method allows data to be collected, events deconstructed and analysed, 
and theories to why and how to be produced. The ‘why’ and ‘how’ can then be 
compared against all data to check for a common thread over time and throughout the 
research to identify patterns which allows events to be predicted and in this thesis 
allows for common factors to be fit into a social science model in order to find the 
answers to the research questions.
9 
When this social science model is applied then a 
model for a new regional organization fitting within the taxonomy can be proposed. Of 
course, pure comparison is flawed as it merely examines the surface facts, however, if 
common themes are identified and distilled then by applying the commonalities of both 
realist and idealist liberal theory to the boiled down universal factors that may be 
omnipresent in all case studies then the theory can explain how to adapt from the 
shortcomings or successes and how to build a better regional model. 
A case study is an empirical research devise. That is, an overarching case study can 
compare many factors and many different studies of empirical or hard evidence 
consisting of interviews, papers, archives and policy papers as well as journals to reach 
the same end goal.
10 
Journals, papers and policy publications will be examined in depth 
in the literature review and throughout the thesis. The case study, as will be the focus of 
the second chapter, can be used to view the subject (for example: Weak central 
governance) with the object (economic dependence theory, institutionalism, neo- 
realism) to find a result and to draw conclusions in a scientific manor. What is flexible 
 
 
 
8 
Thomas, Gary, How to Do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students and Researchers (Los Angeles, 
2011). 
 
10 
Thomas. 
11 
 
about a case study is that it allows the study of ‘falsifiability’ as proposed by Karl 
Popper.
11 
This scientific method demonstrates that if a generalist statement is made such 
as ‘Iran cannot work with Afghanistan’, then by finding one outlier to that assertion, it 
disproves it completely. For example, ‘Iran is building roads in Afghanistan’, thus 
shows us that the general assertion is incorrect and that flexibility exists. This will be 
especially pertinent in my research as I must show that the ability and potential for 
cooperation exists in Central Asia. India, Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan will be examined. We already know that the United States 
and Europe can cooperate in Central Asia, as their self-interest and international relations 
theory and practice demands they must. Thus there will be no need to examine the 
relations of these non-regional nations. Case studies can also be said to be flexible and 
an aid by remaining ‘holistic’ allowing events to be viewed in relation to one 
another and in relation to the ‘big picture’.
12
 
 
Furthermore, in this type of research based scenario, the case study method is a 
strong method specifically for asking ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, to find answers and 
themes for events in which the researcher has little control (such as the situation in 
Central Asia), especially when the research has real life applicability due to its 
contemporaneous nature.
13
 
Now that the overwhelming strengths and positives of the case study have been 
established it bears mentioning that some minor negatives of the case study method are 
that, although hypothesis can be generated there is little ability to test them 
scientifically. Case studies may also lack statistical validity and do not allow 
generalizations to be made, according to some authority.
14 
However, it might be stated 
that in a series of case studies revolving around a common theme, generalisations may 
 
 
11 
Karl R. Popper and Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle, IL: 1974). 
12 
Evert Gummesson, Qaualitative Methods in Management Reseach (Newbury Park, CA,, 1991), 76. 
13 
Yin, 1. 
14 
Hägg, Ingemund, and Gunnar Hedlund,Case Studies’ in Social Science Research,  (Brussels, 1978), 7- 
13. 
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become apparent more easily than in a single study. It has also been suggested that the 
case study has a bias toward verification, that is, the case study might be used to merely 
verify and justify the authors’ hypothesis.15 However, I contend that with that pointed 
out, caution can be taken against such a result. Combined with the other levels of 
methodological research in this particular research study, and examined in totality, a fair 
representation should be found, this is supported by John Walton, ‘case studies are 
likely to produce the best theory.’16 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Historical Analysis 
 
The historical analysis method is a method which both augments the case study to 
 
find the best model of regionalism in Central Asia and also seeks to make sense of the 
 
past through the critical analysis of evidence left behind. In social sciences written 
documents and accounts are the most popular evidence to be examined. Historical 
analysis is important in political research as it allows a background to be established to 
which more modern or contemporaneous data can then be compared and contrasted, to 
produce a strong substantive analysis of the research subject.
17
 
 
Historical analysis is based upon the synthesis and analysis of primary sources in a 
historical context to produce a historiography. Historical analysis has been criticized as 
it is based mainly on the testimony of others and not first-hand knowledge. However, it 
has been countered that if numerous independent sources recant similar testimony the 
weight and validity is increased of such testimony. Also if it can be demonstrated that 
the witness has no reason for bias legitimacy is also increased. According to this 
rationale, a primary source is better than a secondary and a tertiary due to the principal 
 
 
 
15 
Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research’, Qualitative Inquiry, 12/2 
(2006), 219-245. 
16 
Flyvbjerg, 227. 
17 
Philip Gardner in Victor Jupp, The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods (London, 2006), 134- 
136. 
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of stories changing as they are re-told and injected with personal opinions and analysis 
over facts.
18 
This thesis makes use of all three types of sources, in particular, journals, 
policy papers and interviews. There exists a method (a six part test) to authenticate 
evidence and guarantee its value in the research study.
19
 
 
1)  When was the source produced? 
 
2)  Where was it produced? 
 
3)  By whom was it produced? 
 
4)  From what pre-existing material was it produced? 
 
5)  In what original form was it produced? 
 
6)  What is the evidential value of its contents? 
 
Using the above test, a source can be rated as reliable or unreliable and thus its 
weight on the issue to be examined can be determined. Thus if a source is highly 
reliable and has much credible value, then an analysis of the source and lessons learned 
from it can contribute to the overall research study and aid in helping find answers to 
the research questions and affirm or disaffirm the hypothesis posed. 
 
Once sources can be placed in context, or classified into different key topics, as per 
this research study, then the analysis can be extrapolated from the sources and can 
significantly aid in the research, accounting for bias due to personal opinions, heresy 
and political influence or agenda. This potential bias is actually a useful thing, as it helps 
explain the feelings regarding a particular situation or event at the time the source is 
produced, giving further insight. From the historical research method explanatory 
scope, statistical inferences and common themes can be found, all contributing to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
Torsten Thuren, Kallkritik (Stockholm, 1997). 
19 
Gilbert J. Garraghan and Jean Delanglez, A Guide to Historical Method (New York, 1946) 168. 
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research and complimenting and ideally affirming and supporting hypothesis and 
answers found through the other methods of research employed.
20
 
 
One of the main theoretical reasons which helps justify a historical analysis as part 
of the overall research is the accepted norm that ‘history repeats itself’ or the phenomena 
of historical recurrence. Because a historical analysis allows a researcher to pinpoint 
trends which occur over time, the ability to find a pattern of history leading to events 
over history is possible. History is the past, present and future, thus being able to 
identify historical trends makes it easier to draw conclusions, norms and try to prevent 
the causal chain from being reformed over and over again
21
, thus aiding in creating 
 
norms of international behaviour and interaction which can aid in the modelling of a 
regional cooperation agreement in Central Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
 
 
The literature review comprises the second chapter in its entirety. The third 
chapter discusses international relations of Central Asia, The fourth chapter critically 
examines regionalism and regional organizations in Central Asia past and present, 
Chapter five is the conclusion chapter that will introduce the new regional model, which 
can meet the needs of the Central Asian States as well as meet its own funding and 
legitimacy. The organization will be planned out and structured from its location, 
organs and powers in order to be directly applicable to Central Asia, drawing from the 
research generated in this thesis and from graphical interpretations of data presented in a 
social science methodology. The plans for the workable regional model, completely 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
Garraghan and Delanglez, 19, 48, 85. 
21 
G.W. Trompf. The Idea of Recurrence in Western Thought: From Antiquity to The Reformation, 
University of California Press (Berkeley, 1979). 
15 
 
justified from the research will be presented which could then be directly applied to 
 
Central Asia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
 
In order to realize economic growth and stability, Central Asia must establish 
close cooperation and links with key regional powers and neighbouring States. The 
research I propose undertaking on Central Asia is different from the closest similar 
literature in existence, as my research will actively introduce a unique conceptual and 
theoretical model for stability. I will also set myself out from the current trend of 
bilateral cooperation in the field of post-conflict theory by looking at the cause and 
effect of the various types of solutions available, including realist and institutionalist 
self-interest based approaches which focus on varying levels of regional integration 
using a combination of partners and methods. Most other works in my field have been 
over-specific, analysing only parts of a solution to the decades-long conflict in 
Afghanistan. None have coherently and fully tied together the various factors on which 
stability and reconstruction rely in one realistic, applicable framework. 
 
From the existing literature, I was able to determine the effect of regionalism as 
a central theory on reconstruction and nation building. As such, the literature is 
separated into three mutual categories of regionalism, AF-PAK/ international relations 
(IR) and security. None can exist alone. Each is mutually dependent on the other. There 
can be no regionalism without AF-PAK and other IR, and in turn, no IR without 
security. Regionalism is what ties them all together in the cyclic pattern of international 
and regional relations. 
16 
 
A common theme throughout much of the other works, which I have critically 
examined, is that regionalism is a tenet central to re-building fragmented and war-torn 
nations around the world.  These other works criticize past incarnations of regionalism 
in a historical context without ever developing a formidable plan for a new regional 
framework that recognizes these past mistakes. The literature discusses the 
shortcomings of regionalism in regions such as the Balkans, but stops short of 
implementing a suggested plan to counter the failures of regional integration. Also 
absent is a working theory that if the right actors are involved in regionalism combined 
with wider aspects of state building, the outlook is positive in even the most 
conservative of mind-sets. 
 
Works that have not discussed regionalism in any detail are major proponents of 
other methods of stabilization theory. Stabilization theory is the concept that certain 
factors such as education, jobs, or civil security can produce post conflict stability in 
nations given certain factors such as international assistance, acceptability, and 
cooperation from the government. For example, from the literature I have identified 
civic building, education, and industrial growth as factors that should be addressed to 
create a stable and more prosperous Afghanistan. However, these authors fail to 
recognize that these factors are co-dependent on security. This gap is what I will bridge 
which will set my work aside as unique and as furthering the field of knowledge on this 
subject matter. My research will not merely be a theoretical and politico-historical 
insight into Afghanistan, its stability and relations with its neighbours. I will 
accomplish something fundamentally different by making a major contribution to the 
field through my new model for regionalism. 
 
My new model for regionalism incorporates varying levels of cooperation, with 
strong bonds formed through necessary multilateral relations targeting common areas of 
concern. This new regionalism is realized through a hierarchical study of varying levels 
17 
 
of integration and types of governance both on the local and supranational level. Using 
original research in addition to ideas and concepts extrapolated from past academic 
works, I will create a workable framework for a regional forum with defined goals and 
objectives that can benefit Afghanistan and the region. The stabilization of Afghanistan 
through this regional framework should be a top priority for not only the Afghan 
government but also, regional powers, The United States of America, and 
intergovernmental agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Methods and Standards: 
 
 
Prior to the literature review, my research question was: can a new wave of 
regionalism fit a realist future for Afghanistan and Central Asia? I sought to find a 
solution to the decades old war; be that solution diplomatic, with the aid of regional 
powers, economic, or even a negotiated settlement with belligerents. My hypothesis is 
that with dialogue, and by acting in their own self-interest, the selfish desire to 
accomplish each states own goals will aid in accomplishing mutual goals of interest to 
multiple states. As such, Afghanistan’s neighbours can come together to solve the most 
pressing issues, such as counter narcotics. I also put forward that Pakistan and 
Afghanistan are intrinsically linked and should be regarded as indivisible, due to a 
shared, porous border, similar ethnic issues, and a cross-border insurgency. Lastly, 
although education and economic development are good indicators and catalysts of 
stability, they cannot be realized without security and a benign political establishment. 
My proposition for a regional solution for Central Asia is arguably unique. No other 
work I could locate in modern, recent, or historical context touched upon exactly the 
same specific proposal or methods of achieving such stability. 
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In order to complete this literature review, I selected a number of sources that 
provide an accurate and representative sample of the many works that discuss 
Afghanistan and its complexities. I critically examined the coverage of work that deals 
with aspects of Afghan stability and classified the issues into independent factors. 
 
I took a sampling of sources from the wider pool of specific topic related papers 
and selected what stood out as the seminal pieces. Once the key documents, 
representative of a particular topic area, were selected I then classified them and tagged 
them by topic area into a number of categories. The classifications included 
regionalism, AF-PAK/IR, and security. Using these well-defined tags, I created a plan 
to analyse the data recovered from these documents. The data was recovered through 
standard note taking and then sorted through for important information, discussion 
points, and theories to be debunked or absorbed. I then compiled the data in a series of 
spreadsheets by category. Next, I critically examined and analysed the compiled 
information to identify patterns, common threads, and theories that could solve or guide 
my research question. 
 
The documents I selected for this literature review are adequately representative 
of the larger field of academic literature on which my research on Afghanistan and 
Central Asia is focused. The literature I reviewed provides adequate coverage as defined 
by my established standards to source largely representative documents focused on 
tangible issues of my research. By utilizing a representative sampling of the academic 
literature available, I fulfilled the requirement to examine literature closely related to my 
research question to gain a better grasp of the key concepts and theories. This 
methodology allows me to refine and develop my research going forward. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Discussion 
19 
 
While conducting this literature review I noted that when Southwest Asia and 
Afghanistan is in extreme turmoil and near collapse it is a popular subject for academic 
research. I had assumed that most recent academic work would have been spurred by the 
‘war on terror,’ which reenergized interest in international affairs and strategic studies in 
the region. However, I was proven wrong in this estimation because there exists 
relevant research throughout the years with peaks during times of turmoil. Over the 
years, new issues have evolved. Therefore, I analysed key issues over a historical period 
allowing me to apply historical context to these emerging issues, which require further 
analysis. As time goes on, the political debate shift is pivoting away from Afghanistan 
and focusing again on Iraq and now Syria. This drought in new academic material is 
justification in itself for this research. Although Afghanistan has become the forgotten 
war, it is still largely linked to regional security issues and the global community, and 
will continue to threaten local and global peace until it is properly dealt with in earnest. 
 
Academics continue to research the historical issues of regionalism, security, and 
pure regionalism and analyse how these historical concepts can answer today’s security 
and economic problems. There has also been much recent research into regionalism, as 
both Iran and Russia foresee the U.S. withdrawal, with much anticipation, and are 
looking to the future of their relations with Afghanistan and as influencers in Central 
Asia. Noted expert in the area, Barnett Rubin has been working on regionalism and its 
implications on Afghanistan for almost 25 years. His works represent some of the 
keystone literature that I selected for my coverage. Rubin focuses on a realist theoretical 
approach and approaches regionalism as a realist tool to achieve state goals. The 
historical tracing of the early workings of regionalism has proven helpful, and has 
allowed me to develop my own research and theoretical model based 
on the failures of prior efforts identified in the literature. Drawing from the literature in 
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this way and making parallels is immeasurably helpful to answering my own research 
questions and addressing my hypothesis. 
 
Some issues from the region are emerging, and have not been analysed by a 
breadth of historical academic work.  The category of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
relations, AF-PAK as labelled by the U.S. State Department,
22 
is a modern trend; 
recognizing that these two countries politics are officially intrinsic to each other. As 
such, an overwhelming majority of the work dedicated to Pakistan and Afghanistan 
relations and real politic has been conducted within the past three to four years. This 
subject will continue to evolve in the coming years and is pivotal to my research as it is 
directly tied back to regionalism and security. 
 
There is a common thematic base to the literature reviewed, is realism. Liberal 
realism (the English school), republican liberalism, and neo realism fit seamlessly with 
each other and are mutually supportive, dependant theories. From the literature and my 
own hypothesis, I believe that these theoretical frameworks can aid in explaining the 
situation in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia by unifying the elements needed to create a 
workable regional body.  These key theories explain how the organs of state, the 
anarchical international system, and machtpolitik work together to form international 
relations and domestic affairs as it relates to my research question and goal of a 
workable model for modern regionalism. 
 
 
2.3 Regionalism 
 
I state that the Regionalism category is the most important because it is the 
linchpin that ties together security and AF-PAK/International relations. I assert that 
without regionalism each of the other categories acts alone will not be enough to 
stabilize Afghanistan. 
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Regionalism itself cannot work for lasting stability unless in concert with 
security, as with no security there can be no regionalism, and with no regionalism, no 
effective security. My research indicates that regionalism can address Pakistani- 
Afghani problems from an objective view with the aim of resolving these issues. 
Regionalism can also boost educational development and civil society, whilst at the 
same time supporting tangible security to support and defend that civil society. 
 
If a new type of regionalism is sought based on a theoretical model which differs 
and improves on failed plans of the past, then Afghanistan and the region can become 
secure and economically and socially re-developed. 
 
In Afghanistan’s Regional Diplomacy,23 the first point of issue is that Afghanistan 
is not participating in a regional security mechanism. This conclusion is strongly in line 
with my hypothesis and theory. Without integration and acceptance into a regional 
security dialogue (like a NATO of Southwest Asia), Afghanistan cannot 
stand up for itself nor can others aid Afghanistan efficiently. The theory behind this is 
that with cooperative regionalism the anarchy of states can be overcome, as fits realist 
thinking. 
 
Also raised is the interesting premise of Afghanistan as a regional hub for 
energy and transport. I have seen this in other texts and it appears to be an aspirational 
goal. Afghanistan is located at a crossroads and is a geographical bridge from the 
subcontinent to the Middle East. Research into this development is desired and will 
certainly aid me in developing a plan for sustained stability and growth. The authors 
agree with my hypothesis when they conclude from their findings that there will be no 
growth of importance in business and transit until there is security. However, if this 
‘new silk road’ were to become a reality, Afghanistan could develop into the Dubai of 
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the region, offering a centralized hub for cargo, goods, and minerals. This would benefit 
all and should be strongly encouraged and explored. 
 
International cooperation and diplomatic relations are raised but not with much 
depth, opening the need for my research to fill this void. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) is discussed as a suitable regional body; however, I disagree, as the 
SCO is largely undeveloped, unproven, and is not prima facie, willing to aid 
Afghanistan. 
 
Rather, I believe something new and different is a necessity, as the old and 
current system, according to my research, is simply not working. What is pivotal to me, 
as a researcher, is that from this article I gather that China and Iran both have 
convergent interests in Afghanistan. In turn, perhaps other regional powers also have 
interests that overlap and, if they do, working together can only make whatever progress 
is ongoing rapidly accelerate. 
 
Gregg Bruno is very thorough on the topic of regionalism, investment, and Iran. 
In his piece with Lionel Beehner, Iran and The Future of Afghanistan,
24 
the subject of 
ethnicity crops up again as a method of historical instability analysis of Iranian/Afghani 
relations. Understanding the ethnicity of Iran and Afghanistan is vital, as many 
Afghans actually speak Persian and descend from the same ancestry as Persians; 
 
however, other tribes have historically violently opposed any Persian domination. 
 
Research to help better understand this dichotomy would be helpful in getting a 
better bearing of Iran’s international relations with Afghanistan and the region. This is 
because Iran is unique in the region with its own language, ethnicity, and sect of Islam 
that differs from the other regional states. This is not to say that I predict Iran will be 
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hard to work with, on the contrary, I think Iran can bring a lot to the table and its 
diversity can be an asset as long as its international politics are better understood. 
 
This article raises the issue of Iran desiring a weak Afghan state, to prevent long-
term US interests in the region. This idea that Iran is subverting progress and a 
proponent of the anarchical system falls within realist liberal ideology and makes Iran 
even more fascinating and important. From what I have seen so far, and this article 
agrees, it appears Iran is currently following a dual-track foreign policy, building its own 
interests, yet causing strife in order to offset Afghan and US interests. This clearly will 
cause issue, however, if Iran can be brought to the negotiating table and integrated as a 
serious partner, Iran has vast experience in development and can significantly contribute 
to development and diplomacy in Afghanistan. 
 
Another key conclusion to be extrapolated from this article is Iran’s dire need to 
address its drug issues, which can be tied back to a porous Afghani border and most 
likely, the Taliban. Iran also is diametrically opposed to the Taliban and ISIS, their 
ideology and their brand of Islam. These are key pieces of information that can be used 
to build a better regional program with mutual benefits. 
 
Working alone in More Investment Will Bring Security to Afghanistan,
25 
Bruno 
makes his main conclusion that Afghanistan’s ultimate goal should be using its economic 
promise to attract investors. I analyse that more investment will bring jobs and 
prosperity, and, in turn, when Afghans have jobs and opportunity, the Taliban will lose 
ground and Afghans will have a true interest for their own security. Without security, 
there can be no investment – attracting investors will result in both a net increase in 
money and security to protect those investments. This is in keeping with my 
hypothesis and supports my research. The dependency theory is applicable here as the 
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people will depend upon the investors for their jobs and, thus, will want security. Also, 
Afghanistan will depend upon outsiders for investment, until enough Afghans become 
wealthy enough themselves. 
 
Another research focus, which is discussed in the article, is the development of 
state economic planning. Afghanistan has very little experience in this; but states like 
India have ample experience in feeding a large population with very little money, as 
well as industry development. Using new regionalism, translatable skills and central 
planning from other nations can be harnessed for the benefit of Afghanistan and 
ultimately the entire region. 
 
Following on, the author also presses the need for an Afghan national 
development strategy. My research indicates that currently mainly United States and 
European strategy is being applied to Afghan development. This may not be 
appropriate as other Southwest Asian methods may translate easier to the population 
and the nation as a whole. 
 
With the aid of other regional powers, Afghanistan could reach a milestone in its 
own development and make realistic, achievable, and measurable goals. The debate is 
between an Afghan centric or Western centric approach. My research to date and the 
existing sample literature indicates that Western know-how is successful, but only to an 
extent. The long-term study of an Afghan strategy with regional, and even some 
Western support, seems a better combination. Research findings correlate well to this 
notion and, although regional theories exist, a new more advanced and all- 
encompassing plan is necessary. 
 
 
The practical ramifications of such a model are immense, and I can learn from 
the flawed exercises and attempts of the past. The predominant methodology in 
security analysis is analysing statistics and academic research at a distance. However, I 
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propose that on the ground research, combined with interviews and statistical surveys 
would expand the dominant methodology. 
 
Always a pertinent and representative voice, Barnett Rubin’s contribution with 
others in Afghanistan: Reconstruction in a Regional Framework
26 
further emphasizes 
ethnicity. This article, in essence, proves that security, regionalism, and AF-PAK 
relations are tied by the common threads of ethnic tensions, relations, and diplomacy. 
 
From the findings, it is possible to see support for my grounded theory that 
interaction in a positive manner between regional powers is necessary for cooperation. 
Thus, the benefits of cooperation could be realized: a united front against the Taliban, 
civic society, economic development, and mutual security. This liberalist view of 
security, also supported by this article, can only be realized through regionalism, 
leading to liberal democracies that can participate in the international system. Of course, 
it is a possibility that the Taliban may take control again, however, their former 
international relations were largely limited to political engagement with Pakistan, and 
that being at a time when Pakistan was outside of the international community in 
relative isolation due to its development of nuclear weapons. A Taliban today, following, 
the same international norms of the 2001 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, would not 
engage in the wider international relations needed to develop a regional security 
community
27
. This is mainly due to the fact that Taliban international relations were 
rather isolationist and outwardly aggressive to neighbouring states with whom 
cooperation is sought. As such, Afghanistan needs to be ruled by the people, and not the 
Islamists for the sake of peace and stability. 
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Research outcomes in this article are indicative of destabilization spurred by 
aggressive neighbours. The findings support a need for a change in strategy to stem the 
continued rise of the seemingly unstoppable Taliban. The debate, which continues to 
exist in the field of regionalism, is how to bring everyone together to target national 
interests and discourage aggression in favour of cooperation. My research will provide 
these answers and bring a complete solution to the table for the common good, which 
will result in a safer region and more secure Europe and United States in the long-term. 
 
Russia’s Regional Engagement in Afghanistan28 discusses and analyses in depth 
the role that regional actors will play in the future Afghanistan, with a research focus on 
Russia’s strategic outlook. When examining regional interests and players in 
Afghanistan, Russia is of central importance. Russia is a key player, as it is both 
experienced in conflict in Afghanistan and also as a large regional power, with a 
geographical vested interest, and historical role in the region, dating from Soviet times. 
 
A common issue I was able to identify in this document was something I have 
seen throughout the literature, narcotics. Narcotics trafficking and associated crime and 
instability is worrisome to Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, as well as, China, Kyrgyzstan, and 
even Uzbekistan. In essence, narcotics affect the entire region transcending the issues 
of security, political stability, and investment. Ultimately fighting narcotics can be a 
regional effort, rather than a number of disorganized and underfunded national 
initiatives. Identifying this underlying spirit of commonality can be used to further 
efforts of a new regionalism. 
 
Narcotics alone are not the only issue I have, through my analysis, seen as a 
recurring theme affecting security, regionalism, and international relations. Others 
themes discussed in this article, with reference to Russian interests, are pipelines, 
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energy, water, and private sector investment. Of course, as the author points out and in 
agreement with my hypothesis, none of this progress can occur without security, 
especially not private sector investment. I propose that no progress is possible in the 
current state of affairs in Afghanistan. 
 
My research indicates there are many small overlapping efforts going on 
currently by different state actors for varying national reasons. If these un-concerted 
efforts in Afghanistan continue, the result will be nil. However, if these states can act 
together by pooling efforts, and presenting a unified action, the desired result will be 
strengthened. Security, investment, democracy, and civic society are all interdependent. 
This new regionalism would certainly resolve the current debate of ‘what next, 
Afghanistan?’ 
 
Regionalism has been tried and debated before, but has never worked in 
Southwest Asia. However, my research will uncover why this is the case and will go 
beyond current works by proposing a regional confederacy organized around key 
partners. This is where regionalism has failed in the past by not going beyond papers, 
talks, or not being truly inclusive for selfish national reasons or due to mere myopia. 
 
Is a Regional Strategy Viable for Afghanistan?
29 
Examines the history of 
regionalism in Afghanistan. The article concludes that there exist informal pacts with 
converging interests between states who oppose each other. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
for example both support more extreme versions of Islam and attempt to mould 
Afghanistan for their own strategic interests as a counter balance to India (for Pakistan) 
and Iran (for Saudi Arabia). The authors also informally ally Russia, India, and Iran on 
the other side; presumably, as these three seek to expand business and influence in 
Afghanistan, whilst undermining American policy. 
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This discussion of national interests as the biggest single influence going forward 
is rational. It also fits with my hypothesis that self-interest will inevitably drive 
regionalism as there are benefits which can enrich all participants. Furthermore, a new 
issue raised by this article is the role of the United States in failing to achieve peace. 
Lessons can be learned from the success and failures of the United States to formulate a 
new strategy that still incorporates the United States, but only indirectly. This 
incorporation is further examined in chapter two. 
 
An interesting point is raised in the conclusions of this article about Afghanistan 
as a transit state, also discussed in other works.  Establishing Afghanistan as a Dubai- 
like, transit hub for transport and energy is a positive and should be investigated further. 
This article cites construction projects and Afghanistan’s own national goals of regional 
diplomacy and trade, as future indicators of progress. However, this is not feasible due 
to the notion of regional powers proxy fighting each other to the burden of Afghanistan. 
Thus, although it is true to assert that regional powers are not acting with one purpose 
today, it would be wrong to assume this is impossible going forward. 
 
This is where my research questions and hypothesis diverge from this article. 
The notion of selfish national interest can be overcome and has been overcome in other 
areas of the world, which I shall investigate to draw parallels. To rule out a strong 
regional association due to ‘timid’ states, as the article suggests, is incorrect. The 
rhetoric and policies of China, Iran, and Russia, as well as, Pakistan and India quickly 
debunk the theory that these states are ‘timid.’ 
 
The United Nations has unsuccessfully taken steps in the past to attempt a 
regional solution. This is investigated in Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan Conflict and 
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United Nations Peacemaking.
30  
This article examines a historical context to discover 
why aid and peace-making has not worked over the years. It is concluded that two 
Afghanistan’s exist; one dependant on aid and one a rural farming nation. These two 
worlds are so dissimilar that it is hard for the rural to accept, or even need, governance 
from Kabul. Narcotics are discussed as a destabilization crop, and this is tied back to 
the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. There is such a difference between the city and 
country that values do not translate. This is clearly a problem that needs to be 
addressed. How to do this is not discussed in depth, but many logical ideas flow from 
the assertion. 
 
Discussion of regional proxy wars and self-serving interests of other regional 
powers is again a common theme, so defeating these long seeded rivalries will be a top 
priority for my research, as this poses the biggest threat to my model. The strength of 
the Taliban is examined, as by 2001 it was generally accepted that the Taliban were 
devastated. Fast forward to today where Taliban power is waxing. A plan to deal 
directly with the Taliban is thus, needed. 
 
This article supports my research and hypothesis in providing me counter- 
arguments to disprove. However, this article is against my research as it concludes that 
the anarchical system will reign supreme and hinder any regionalist, or realist approach. 
Contrary to that assertion, the literature does specifically mention that UN peace making 
efforts in the 90’s expressly failed for one reason, lack of Taliban inclusion. This 
isolation of the Taliban in peace efforts and regional development has also been 
reflected in the relative failure of the Bonn agreement. Thus, if the Taliban is included, 
progress can be made and a regional solution can function. From my research, it is 
apparent other regional powers can evolve and work together, even if on a limited scale, 
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as stability and security from Al-Qaeda is in the common national interest. As such, the 
anarchy of the international system can be harnessed and turned around to benefit the 
region. Self-interest can spur cooperation to ensure national stability and cooperation on 
a number of issues warranting mutual attention. 
 
If there is no regionalism to make Central Asia and thus Afghanistan stable, then 
the world will be at risk of a destabilized state with no security apparatus, no 
functioning economy, and a lack of diplomatic links. Combine this with a weak 
government and a lack of funds and ability, and the stage is set for further trouble. 
 
This very scenario is critically examined in Afghanistan and Regional 
Instability: A Risk Assessment.
31  
This assessment has research findings that indicate 
that instability from Pakistan will continue to spread to Afghanistan if not stemmed. 
This is supportive of my research and also continues the common theme of Pakistan and 
Afghan relations being one in the same. The concessions granted to militants in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are analysed in this assessment and 
characterized as an abject failure. With no government checks, the FATA is now a 
porous border for militants to move back and forth. As such, more Pakistani 
cooperation is necessary and, I assert, regional powers could also aid in stability. 
 
 
The weakness of many of the Central Asian neighbouring states also poses a 
threat to an independent Afghanistan. This, of course, all relates back to the Taliban 
and militant Islam. Without regional cooperation, these groups would have free reign 
over Afghanistan again and, could destabilize other nations or exploit the weakness of 
the small Central Asian states to their advantage. The conclusions reached include the 
need for the United States and the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) to 
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find a way to include China and Russia because with no regional engagement from 
these big players Afghanistan will soon be on its own when US and ISAF troops leave. 
 
This ties back to my hypothesis that a regional framework can bring in the big 
players and the small powers, to help Afghanistan; whilst mutually helping themselves 
by exercising regional leadership, passing on skills, and taking a more active role in 
regional progress and stability. The lack of US power in the region in future opens the 
door for the big regional powers to exert influence. If these powers can do this at the 
helm of a new international body then their political clout will justify the new body and 
will give it the credentials necessary to be active, useful, and accepted on the 
international level. It should be noted, that China is not usually involved in international 
actions and this can serve as an opportunity for such involvement, 
simultaneously protecting Chinese business and political interests, which is the purpose 
 
of a regional model – benefits for all involved.  An interesting twist on this power 
 
vaccum is illiberal regionalism, or ‘strong man hegemony’, a relatively radical 
 
academic idea put forward for the region in articles such as Understanding the 
 
Authoritarian State: Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, wherein Dr. David Lewis, a 
 
recognized expert on Central Asia, puts forth the concept of a third option. An option 
 
free from judgment, and an option which returns power to the traditional patrimonial 
 
hierarchical ways of Central Asia. The notion that strong men could and should run the 
 
region in a regional solution which provides brute force stability is daring, bold, and 
 
very realistic in its application. The empirical evidence exists that Central Asia craves 
 
this sort of traditional governance and indeed thrives upon it, with mutual benefits for 
 
all. In the wake of the past twenty years of failed western liberal democracy, illiberal 
 
regionalist theory is a welcome departure from the done and mundane and dares us to 
 
consider a post western method of regional hierarchical peace. 
32 
 
The article also finds that involvement of all classes of the economy, tribes, and 
religions is necessary. In short, without a regional approach the regional instability of 
today will only get worse. US involvement can be categorized as a bandage on a wound, 
but a regional solution could be the operation needed to treat the underlying injury. If 
there is no treatment and the bandage goes away, only further infection and spreading of 
disease will occur. 
 
Throughout the regionalism category, many common themes and concepts have 
been identified: Iran, China, Russia, and India, as well as, Pakistan will play key roles in 
the future. A regional organization that addresses the issues and concerns of all parties 
involved, even the small Central Asian republics is a necessity. Wider ranging political 
ambitions of even the United States and Saudi Arabia will need to be accommodated 
and considered, as both could significantly contribute and support such a regime. 
Ethnicity and religion have been identified as factors of extreme importance to 
regionalism and thinking of Afghanistan and Pakistan as one has been solidified. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 AF-PAK/ International Relations 
 
In Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban Insurrection in the Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan,
32 
the authors plainly spell out the link between the Pakistani Taliban 
and the hard-core Afghan Taliban. The cross-border Taliban has similar motives and 
means of achieving instability. The authors further warn of a collapse in regional and 
global security if the twin threats are not countered. While this analogy the literature 
makes may be hyperbolic, the take away is that regional stability in Central Asia 
through regionalism is a major component to international security. The article 
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discusses Taliban financing in Pakistan (which can be translated to both sides of the 
border), and uses a theoretical framework to demonstrate how the Taliban seek to 
destroy international norms and structure, in order to further the goals of their own 
militant Islamist system. 
 
Narcotics, crime, violence, and a weak central government all play a part of the 
destabilization. Regionalism is discussed, as neighbouring states have overlapping 
interests in the stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and, thus, securing and 
normalizing (or not) the border areas will have wider ramifications for the international 
system and regional cohesion. This piece supports my own research and hypothesis and 
provides a Pakistani perspective, which is both enlightening and undeniably similar to 
western strategy. 
 
The argument forwarded herein supports the concept of regionalism and alludes 
to possible actions from other states, but stops short of making recommendations 
focusing, rather, on the state of emergency in Pakistan. These findings suggest the 
Taliban are linked and not divided by the border. This supports my theory that the 
cross-border Taliban are headquartered in Pakistan’s border agencies and as a result, the 
fate of Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely linked. What is needed is a clear plan to 
strengthen state power and consolidate control in Pakistan (a mirror of Afghanistan). 
This article indirectly suggests that unique research is needed on regionalism; especially 
focusing on AF-PAK relations and that a new solution could help stop the Taliban. 
 
When I critically examined and analysed Pakistan, Afghanistan and the 
Taliban,
33 
I noted the theoretical framework was supportive of my research. Liberalism 
was the main theory advocated, calling for greater freedoms for the Afghan people, the 
ability to chart their own destiny and not be dominated by any one ethnic group or 
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nation. This lack of freedom is the fundamental problem with the current strategy in 
 
Afghanistan, according to my hypothesis and research objectives. 
 
 
Military dominance of Afghanistan by foreign powers or the Taliban simply will 
not work.  Security and stability must be fostered in a more creative, original way 
combining the successes of previous efforts with renewed interdependency for all 
regional actors. Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban supports the theory I advocate 
that AF-PAK relations are inseparable as the two share a common history, common 
enemy, and adversely affect each other and the region. 
 
Something novel yet obvious that I had not previously come to my attention, was 
domino theory. Similar to U.S. anti-communist ideology in Southeast Asia in the middle 
twentieth century, this article purports that a total collapse of Afghanistan into the hands 
of Taliban rulers would cause Pakistan to also collapse and could spread to all of Central 
Asia. The article supports this theory well and creates a realistic belief that unchecked 
the Taliban could cause serious stability issues throughout Central Asia. 
This militant Islam domino theory is in keeping with the hypothesis and helps answer 
the research question in the belief expressed that Afghanistan and Pakistan’s stability 
and state building is key to the region, and, thus, the world at large. The creation of a 
new regional body to counter this domino threat is paramount, as a means to control 
conflict and bridge the many differences and competing interests in Southwest Asia. It 
should not be forgotten that a weak and unchecked region could breed terrorism, which 
would again bring the US back to the region, something neither side can afford. 
 
I believe Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban supports this hypothesis. The 
logical follow-on from this piece of literature is to continue research into how and why 
the Taliban seeks to collapse civil society in Pakistan and Afghanistan, to expose what 
can be done by the region to strengthen the state organs and prevent total collapse and 
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re-lapse. A strong regional body that is capable of administration and emergency rapid 
reaction is also key, continuing research on how to create such a body is necessary. 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban is strong in its exposure of what is going wrong 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan with regards to the Taliban, and its only weakness is 
stopping short of making formal recommendations to fully combat this, hence the 
necessity of my research. 
 
After analysing Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,34 I deduced that 
respecting and harnessing the power in cultural and religious customs is paramount to 
confronting the Taliban. The theory advocated is that culture must be understood and 
used as a weapon against militants, who are united across the border by language, 
values, and ethnicity. Looking at the insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan on ethnic 
lines, the strife can be traced from ethnic domination of one group over another in 
politics. 
 
This work further solidifies the concept of AF-PAK relations and discusses the 
world of the frontier peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan, whom cross the border at 
leisure seemingly unstopped by national lines and the Pakistani Army. Much is 
unknown about these tribal people whose relations run deeper than nationality labels. 
Understanding the power of ethnicity and language in Pakistan and Afghanistan is 
particularly useful in understanding how to build a better, modern Afghanistan. 
 
This article advocates addressing the issues in the border agencies as key to the 
stability of the Pakistani State. The author also analyses the Islamist domino theory 
recognizing the border is nothing more than a formality, which explains how the roots 
of the Taliban can penetrate deep inside of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This work is 
incredibly helpful in identifying the key areas of Pakistan controlled by the Taliban and 
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their allies, or more relevantly, the areas not in government control. My research 
hypothesis concurs with this, as a key to stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is 
the provincial recognition of respective central government authority. 
 
There needs to be further research into how to bring the Pakistani Taliban to the 
negotiating table, as isolation and military action has not worked. More importantly, 
ceding power and governance to the Pakistan frontiers has only showcased a weak 
government without trade-off or benefit to the central government. The cessation of 
power has only given the Taliban better abilities to operate, organize, and build distrust 
of the central government, contributing to its overall weakness. 
 
It must be ascertained how to reign in the self-governing and de-facto self- 
governing regions of Pakistan, and put them back under the authority of the central 
government. In turn, the central government must build legitimacy, rule of law, and 
respect for its authority in order to exercise within its remit. This theoretical framework 
and concept can then migrate to the Afghan central government and be applied there, as 
the two nation’s fundamental issues are co-dependent. 
 
With this in mind, the theoretical framework indicates that a weak Afghanistan 
will prevent a strong Pakistan and a weak Pakistan will prevent a strong Afghanistan. I 
intend to research how they can operate in symbiosis and with the aid of the region at 
large to create mutual stability and prosperity. 
 
Picture the Problem: Taliban Presence in Afghanistan,
35 
is a good source for 
showcasing the power of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although the statistics are slightly 
outdated, they are still representative of Taliban power. In November 2007, for 
example, the Taliban controlled 50% of Afghanistan. By 2008 that figure had increased 
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to 75% actual or de-facto control of Afghan territory. The surge no doubt brought much 
territory back under US or Afghan government control, but the real lesson learned is the 
ongoing power of the Taliban. Although it is argued that the Taliban have little actual 
support, I predict that fear alone is not the reason for such successful wide-ranging 
control. Therefore, social issues must be addressed and a stronger government for the 
Afghans must represent a better alternative to Taliban governance. With AF-PAK 
relations so key, I predict that Taliban dominance of this level could also occur in 
Pakistan if reforms and better methods are not applied. More research is needed, but the 
figures are alarming and show a need for a different approach in Afghanistan-Pakistan 
dealings with the Taliban and greater stability strategy. A unified front against the 
Taliban might be helpful, as is mutual state building, especially with the help and 
sanction of other state powers. Bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan back into the 
community of nations and helping remove some anarchy from the anarchical system is 
the best approach, in my opinion, and this is what I take from this supportive literature. 
 
In regards to pure Pakistani affairs, Pakistan: Weathering the Storm,
36 
attempts 
to use history to help answer the question of why Pakistan is not a developed liberal 
democracy. Pakistan is compared to Europe after World War II.  Europe rose from the 
ashes, the author asserts, due to the Marshall Aid plan and a true commitment to the 
Europe region by the United States. The author asserts that had Pakistan not been 
ignored in that round of development monies and support, then maybe it would not be 
the state it is today. Although I agree with the thought process of the author, I do not 
think that it is appropriate to attempt to link the two. 
 
As Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently recovering from war and have 
 
broken, disenfranchised, war scarred people, it is only logical that a new Marshall Aid 
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type program could have the same results as it did in Europe. I think this conclusion is 
reached by many, but what is not understood is the corruption at play in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan which has made much of the aid programs strategically pointless. 
 
I will continue research into how to prevent such graft, but I fear it has become 
an important supplement to government salaries in Southwest Asia, much like in Africa. 
Notwithstanding, there have been success stories from poor nations with regards to re- 
development where corruption has been targeted and stamped out to a large extent. I 
will compare and contrast various models and scenarios to attempt to beat corruption as 
a roadblock. Another reason aid in Southwest Asia is different to Europe is that in post- 
war Europe, religion and violence were not linked as they are in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. There was very little tribal violence and all states were previously 
developed nations with functioning governments, used to statehood and state control. 
This easily controlled population which craved norms is probably what helped post-war 
Germany the most. 
 
Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, I assert, is not used to a functioning 
democracy, at least not in recent generational common thought. This can be fixed 
through building better state institutions and winning the trust of the population. The 
author is a keen proponent of republican liberalist theory and argues that with western 
help, democracy can flourish in Pakistan; I fully agree. 
 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era,
37 
is conceptually an in- 
depth report into the international relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 
another work signifying the legitimacy of the AF-PAK relations label. 
 
Pakistan’s covert role in the insurgency in Afghanistan is researched in detail; 
 
concluding that, in agreement with my hypothesis, Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
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intrinsically linked in violence and politics. Research points to Pakistan playing both 
sides as it purports to fight the Taliban. Pakistan makes gestures of cooperation, yet at 
the same time, the Pakistani security apparatus is seen as complacent with the Taliban 
and even aiding them. It appears Pakistan’s motives include shifting Taliban focus 
from Pakistan to Afghanistan, in order to de-facto fight the United States and the Karzai 
regime. Pakistan’s motives are cleverly discussed in this piece but more research is 
clearly needed into the root of Pakistan’s actions. I would propose that the Pakistani 
Army and the civil state speak and act differently. If they are going to work to stabilize 
the region, if this is their actual goal (which it should be to prevent Pakistan’s own 
collapse) then they must truly work as one and act in concert for a single purpose. 
 
This article exposes a large rift between the two countries, a rift made of power, 
ethnicity, and historical fear and distrust. This research seems to indicate that, although 
the two nations are linked and the importance of successful AF-PAK relations is 
important to mutual and regional stability, the two nations do not see eye to eye. This 
rift compounds hostile intentions resulting in stalled progress for both and the region at 
large. Although this seems negative, the new regional body, which I seek to propose, 
would address these ills and could help close the rift. 
 
The theories purported in this academic work fit within liberal realism, republican 
liberalist, and structural functionalist theory: state institutions are praised and called a 
necessity; the need to return to normalcy is strikingly evident in order for Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to become rational state actors once more. My theories and hypothesis are 
bolstered by this article: a regional framework is needed, weak AF-PAK relations are 
identified, and the need to remedy this is vital. The author also recognizes the instability 
Pakistan could bring on itself by playing this two-sided game. More research into 
Pakistani motivations and their imagined end-game would be especially 
insightful. 
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This work also counters my proposal for a regional body, to the extent that it 
exposes the real differences in AF-PAK relations and challenges the desire, will, and 
ability of these states to work for common good.  A realist strategy would dictate that 
states could try to not cooperate if it is against their interests; however, it can also be 
stated that if cooperation is in a state’s self-interest the state will cooperate with other 
states by necessity or to further their own self-interest. Either way, cooperation is 
achieved. 
 
The last piece of literature critically examined in the AF-PAK relations category 
is Pakistan after Musharraf,
38 
author Frederic Grare takes an interesting and unexpected 
approach and has a question and answer session about the state of Pakistan after the 
departure of former President Musharraf. The author discusses prospective changes in 
Pakistan, concluding that Musharraf was a burden on the civil and military systems, and 
predicting that democratic change should be easier in the future. The advancements 
civil society and the national government can achieve are alluded to and a more stable 
Pakistan is concluded a possibility. I would definitely say I agree that a transition to a 
more democratic civil government is a positive thing, but it is a long way from an ideal 
solution, according to my research. 
 
In keeping with realist theory, the author and I agree that reforms are a necessity 
in the government and military in order to have a more satisfied public, and a more 
stable country able to return to democracy that can be a strong state. However, this 
literature does not delve into how these changes will occur and clearly more research is 
needed. I can extract from this text that I will need to critically examine the changes in 
Pakistan to see how they relate to knock-on effects in Afghanistan. I will also need to 
analyse what steps can be taken in Pakistan to aid transition back to democracy, a better 
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effort to fight terrorism, and how to create a situation where the government, not the 
 
Taliban, controls the land. 
 
 
Naturally, such a strategy could easily be migrated to Afghanistan, as the two 
are so tightly interwoven and suffer from many of the same ills. Much can be learned 
from this analysis, yet much is clearly still to be uncovered. Research needs to be 
approached from a differing perspective to conclude how to stop and prevent Taliban 
sympathy from within the central government, whilst strengthening the rule of law and 
democratic institutions on both sides of the Durant line to work for mutual stability. 
 
In the category of AF-PAK relations, the research methodology employed in all 
works has been fairly uniform. The notable exception to the norm has been the Q&A 
session in Pakistan After Musharraf, where the author himself is examined about the 
international and domestic ramifications of a Pakistan without Musharraf. The 
methodology of delivery was interesting, but the gathering of facts and research is not 
heavily discussed and seems to flow mainly from research and knowledge as a fellow 
with the Carnegie Institute. 
 
By contrast, the main method of research conducted has been interview and 
research based, with conclusions drawn from contemporaneous and historical data on 
the international relations of the region. Current events and statistics from news data is 
important, as the situation is ever changing and predictions made can be proven, 
disproven, or reversed everyday as things progress in the region. The works are mainly 
focused on what is happening and why, but is lacking in how to remedy the situation. 
This is why there is a need for my research in this topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Security 
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The third tranche into which documents are classified based upon their content, 
theoretical framework, and potential comparison to my own research is security. 
Although this is the broadest category, it is also highly pertinent, as without security 
there can be no stability and with no stability, no development. Therefore, security is a 
necessary factor to achieve anything of worth in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia. 
 
In Afghanistan’s Regional Diplomacy,39 the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies lays out its theory that although rudimentary progress is being made in 
economic development in Afghanistan, the cornerstone of regional security is missing. 
This fits in well with my overarching theory of realist international relations. These 
common themes pass throughout most of the works I reviewed and are especially 
prevalent in this work; pointing out the acute relevance of the theory and the norms that 
characterize it. 
 
The authors of this work define and recognize what is vital to economic success 
and regional stability in Afghanistan. I was able to extract and critically evaluate the 
regional security mechanisms that, failed, are currently in place, and ought to be in 
place. This literature theoretically and conceptually supports my hypothesis that a 
stronger regional framework is necessary for economic prosperity, achieved in 
symbiosis with regional security and mutuality. Another aspect of which there is 
mutual agreement with my research and this work is that economic development with 
regional partners in areas such as energy, water, and transit is highlighted. 
 
My theoretical formula forecasts that with significant investments and aid from 
neighbouring countries and regional powers, coordinated via a regional forum, progress 
will occur. This literature is indicative of the neighbouring countries primordial 
interests’ in Afghanistan and lists each country’s involvement. What is not noted 
 
 
 
39 
‘Afghanistan's Regional Diplomacy’, 1-2. 
43 
 
though is why these nations are getting involved. National interest is the natural 
common reason, but this article falls short of recommendations of how the individual 
national interests can be exploited to find common ground, even if out of selfish self- 
interest only. This is an interesting and novel concept which I developed as a result of 
this literature. 
 
I think the idea of overlapping interests can be very useful when looking at 
regionalism and ways to involve non-traditional actors, such as China. This literature 
actually advocates an Afghan centric perspective, which is unique as most other works 
focus on ramifications for the region at large, the United States, or Western Europe. 
This differing perspective allows me to realize that my new model of inclusive 
regionalism would satisfy American, European, and Afghan strategic desires through 
compromise and mutual assistance. I find this reassuring going forward in my research. 
 
 
In Ill-Advised Retreat from Afghanistan,
40 
the author follows traditional security 
approach theory and categorizes the military failures in Afghanistan as stemming only 
from a lack of resolution on behalf of the United States. The theoretical framework that 
the author, representing the Council on Foreign Relations, pursues is traditional 
liberalism. The writer discusses ‘fragile and reversible gains’ and blames most security 
issues on the wrong application of US force. The writer proposes a better strategy to 
deal with the Taliban and insurgency through the use of force, which while interesting 
from a pure security perspective, is only American based and does nothing to address 
the underlying issues of the conflict. The theoretical side of this article is conflict based 
and hawkish. It is not based on true international relations theory, which disagrees with 
my multi-faceted approach to security as part of the greater regional strategy. This 
article suggests Hobbean realism found in liberal realism doctrine, as seen through the 
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struggle for power through force. However, this does little to further the debate as to 
what can be done to fix Afghanistan in the long-term. 
 
This work merely facilitates my understanding of how US strategy could have 
theoretically played out, but offers no deeper analysis. This piece is mainly a 
summation and criticism of US war strategy, specifically confined to counter- 
insurgency strategy. The author suggests a strategy to defeat the Taliban with force 
alone; however, there is no evidence that this will be successful. I think that further 
research into the long-term ramifications of US strategy in Afghanistan would be 
helpful to my research, as it would aid me in devising a way to prevent history from 
repeating itself. 
 
In Can Afghanistan be Saved,
41 
the author poses questions to NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This methodology is actually more pure research 
than traditional academic analysis, though there is critical reasoning in the questions 
asked. This is a radical departure from the methodology that all other authors used 
within this category. The main method of field work and research, by academics within 
this category, was compilation and analysis of statistics and interviews. 
 
Discerningly, this piece is not a formal academic journal, which I think actually 
helps give a broader representation of sources and is, thus, useful to me as a researcher. 
Although non-traditional in an academic sense, this piece captures the author’s motives, 
and research questions contained within the carefully crafted questions. From these 
questions, I can extrapolate the author’s hypothesis, of how to make the Muslim world 
aware of the issues in Afghanistan and increase involvement of the Islamic world. 
 
The author also poses questions about engaging with Pakistan and other partners 
 
in the region, but does not go on to ask about the possibility of concerted regional 
 
 
41 
Mina Al-Oraibi‘Can Afghanistan Be Saved?’, The Christian Science Monitor, (3 Nov. 2009). 
45 
 
efforts any more than to suggest a conference. This is where my research is again 
warranted. There is a glimpse of hope in renewed regionalism, as in many other works, 
but that glimpse is just left as that alone, an aspiration. 
 
I know that if I can achieve something tangible with my research on the subject, 
academia would be enriched by filling the gap. I definitely agree with the researcher but 
think that having support in spirit by regional partners is not as good as my proposed 
goal of actual regional engagement. 
 
The author focuses on respect for the culture and religion as means to foster 
stability, but I think this is a shallow and fruitless examination. However, the author 
briefly discusses security and troop numbers; that is what I believe makes this article 
about security and not just regionalism and cultural relativism. 
 
Furthermore, I think the author is mainly interested in advocating a theoretical 
policy of limited regionalism and cultural sensitivity. I fail to see, and the author fails to 
demonstrate, how cultural respect is anything more than a nicety and a diplomatic tool. 
In the grand strategy for stability in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia I think being 
inclusive and civil will accomplish very little in terms of tangible goals. 
 
Another piece examined was South-West Asia after the Taliban,
42  
in which 
Mohammed Ayoob, reflects on developments in Afghanistan after liberation from the 
Taliban. This piece fits well with my hypothesis and research question. The findings of 
Ayoob are that the instability of Afghanistan threatens the region and the domino theory, 
which I previously identified, is also mentioned. As such, this piece follows the same 
theoretical framework as my research. 
 
This article is almost a decade old and some of the predictions have proven 
 
false, but not at the fault of the author. The author was correct that Karzai did seem to 
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be a moderate Pashtun choice as leader, but his presidency is so sullied now that he may 
pose the biggest risk to Afghan stability. The article discussed how former Pakistani 
president Musharraf promised to get involved in the war on terror, but, as we now 
know, this was due to selfish political reasons. Pakistan’s own national motives today 
remain unclear and unpredictable. 
 
So whilst very optimistic, the analysis in this article is still supportive for 
surmising that Pakistan will remain volatile and a threat to world peace for years to 
come. The author’s work concurs with my own hypothesis in identifying Iran and India 
as well suited partners for the United States in the region. I think this theory of 
regionalism can be tweaked so that Iran and India could be successful leaders even 
without the United States physical involvement. However, US assistance diplomatically 
and financially would still likely be necessary. 
 
The author, true to realist doctrine, is identification of ethnic tensions within 
Afghanistan and the neighbouring nations, which could quickly lead to another 
breakdown and exit of Afghanistan from the international system. I conclude from 
these ideas that a support for a united effort to help Afghanistan will lead to mutual 
cooperation as long as the proper avenues are followed and the cooperation is to an 
extent which is acceptable to all nations involved. 
 
This article introduced me to the novel concept of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s 
influence on Afghanistan of competing forms of extreme Islam. This competing Islam 
can cause more instability with rival factions funded by third-parties proxy wars against 
each other. I had not previously given much thought to this conflict in my model of 
regionalism, but now I believe that with more research I could formulate a buffer 
between the competing Islamic sects. 
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Lastly, the author is very clear that ethnic conflicts and Taliban sympathy are 
rife in the Afghan national government. However, the author does not propose a 
remedy and, therefore, my research is necessary and justified to contribute to the field. 
 
In Talking to the Taliban,
43 
the author advances a very different and almost 
 
fringe perspective suggesting serious negotiations with the Taliban. This realist strategy 
departs from the conventional American security perspective of defeating the Taliban 
purely militarily and socially, and moves towards a more benign European school of 
thought, embodied in dialogue and diplomacy. 
 
Although US contemporary strategy in Afghanistan also involves negotiation 
with the Taliban, I would characterize modern US negotiations as not genuine. The US 
has refused to attend events in Russia in 2017 to negotiate with the Taliban and other 
parties, and there seems a lack of concrete efforts to engage the enemy at the 
negotiating table. There are no publically available tangible goals of desired 
accomplishments from these talks and it appears that they are still only in their earliest 
phase. My research and hypothesis insists upon true, meaningful negotiations with the 
Taliban and all key elements, and it is not clear if this is happening today or not. 
Defined goals must also be chosen so that negotiations have an end game and are not 
merely a delay tactic. 
 
The author’s theoretical framework is realist, as peace with the Taliban is sought 
and strategies to achieve adherence to an international system of norms are proposed in 
order to further self interest. This article concurs with my work, in that both advocate 
negotiating with the Taliban and being more inclusive. However, our hypotheses 
disagree with the extent to which Taliban can be rehabilitated. 
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My research to date predicts that having the Taliban switch sides is rarely 
effective, easy, or genuine. The author indicates that the moderate Taliban can be 
separated from the hard-core Taliban and brought back to aid the government. I contend 
that this is a fallacy and that all Taliban are in fact hard-core and dedicated, evidenced in 
their commitment to the Taliban and that so called rehabilitation, though preferential, is 
merely an aspiration. However, more research is necessary to determine if the Taliban 
can be successfully included as a nonviolent element of the new Afghan government, 
though recent records demonstrate a great deal of insider violence. 
 
Realistic negotiations with the Taliban are a novel concept supported by other 
nations and tribes, but yet to be implemented. My research will propose a model for a 
regional body, which can work with the Taliban to build and ensure security. 
 
Barnett Rubin has produced some of the most useful literature on the subject of 
security in Afghanistan. In The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to 
Failed State,
44 
which is a piece dating from the early 1990’s, Rubin’s research 
concludes that the solution will not be ethnic, but that ethnicity is a consistent factor in 
the instability of the country. However, I disagree with Rubin, as my hypothesis 
includes a solution to which ethnicity must be respected because my research indicates 
that there can be no solution which is fully comprehensive unless all ethnic factors are 
considered. 
As Afghanistan, Pakistan, and most of their regional neighbours are divided 
upon ethnic lines the issue of ethnicity is one of utmost importance to a lasting peace. 
As such, ethnicity deserves both more research and attention. Although Rubin believes 
ethnicity is not the solution, he does chronicle the varying ethnic groups, thus, laying the 
foundation for further research. 
 
 
44 
Barnett Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven, 
1995). 
49 
 
Ethnic research is necessary for a plan, which will include the needs and desires 
of all groups who could pose a threat to the stability of the Afghan state. Currently no 
system of real interaction in the Western sense exists between these ethnic groups. 
However, if ethnic groups begin to interact as actors in the Western sense, then 
cooperation and a cohesive, representative national government will be realized. 
 
In Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy,45  Rubin 
unequivocally concludes, ‘military domination of the Pakistani state is the problem.’ 
This key point is representative of the current security situation in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The security forces of Pakistan are almost schizophrenic. Whilst Pakistan 
says they fight terrorism, and indeed do battle in the frontier regions, at the same time 
the military and security services are actively aiding the Taliban. My hypothesis 
concurs with Rubin in that Pakistani instability and domestic strife is a long-term 
security concern which will hamper progress in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
A key concept that Rubin introduces is that the Pakistani abrupt reversal of their 
pro-Taliban policy, is merely a tool to re-align themselves with US support and funding. 
I believe this is due to self-interest, fear of lack of influence, and as a stand against 
India. More research is necessary to determine how to make Pakistan sincere in 
stabilizing the security situation. 
 
A rational Pakistan would naturally want to stop aiding the very terrorists who 
cause instability on both sides of the border. Unfortunately, I imagine that, due to the 
anarchy of the international system, a realist minded Pakistan wants to keep its options 
open. Rubin does not elaborate on how to make Pakistan help itself. However, I 
theorize that having the society and government back under genuine civilian control and 
establishing a legitimate democracy is the first step, as Pakistan’s stability is tied to the 
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security of the region at large. The second step, as my research suggests, is having 
 
Pakistan play an important role in regional politics and security. 
 
 
Another piece of important representative literature in the category of security is 
Saving Afghanistan.
46 
Here Rubin focuses on the borderlands between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan as important for security for the region. The article confirms that the border 
areas are a porous hotbed of terror, a constant that I have encountered throughout the 
literature. 
 
Rubin also concludes that state building through institutions, government 
services, and schools are ways to defeat the Taliban without force. This effort to 
establish good governance and society if to make the state appear strong can be seen to 
follow with realist theory. I agree that civil society, education, and government facilities 
are needed, as they demonstrate central control projecting a strong image of a legitimate 
government. The Taliban currently offers such services, and, logically, the central 
government should also be able to provide such services. 
 
To this extent, this article supports my own research leading me to believe that 
even more research is necessary. Does education really mean a safer country? Of this I 
am not sure. I propose that it is helpful, but I am not sure if it is the end game. Clearly, I 
also think that security, as well as institutions of the state are needed. One alone will not 
keep the people safe. 
 
My research is more radical, in that it is all encompassing and follows a multi- 
stage approach of security, civil society, and regionalism simultaneously. I predict this 
multi-front assault of power, security, and diplomacy will make a significant difference 
and the literature concurs. 
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The final document reviewed in the security category is Afghanistan and Its 
Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood,
47 
the author follows a regionalist 
approach which could be characterized as American/European centric and embraces 
republican liberalist ideology with regards to Afghanistan and Pakistan security. 
 
The research of the author supports my grounded theory that security is a co- 
dependent factor, which Afghanistan alone cannot create and maintain without other 
regional powers participating in a security capacity. What is especially strong about 
this article is that it demonstrates the evolution of strategic thinking over time, which 
links security, diplomacy and, regionalism. Paying close attention to regional rivalries 
and big power agendas are a rational conclusion of the author’s work, as he theorizes 
that these rivalries and goals will adversely affect the security situation in Afghanistan 
for the worse. I found the author’s research findings concerning Afghanistan as a 
‘regional fulcrum’ to be a solid concept, and will explore this theory when examining 
the leverage of Afghanistan by other powers as my research progresses. 
 
The influence of Pakistan, India, and Iran is examined, affirming the ability of 
these states to affect conflict in Afghanistan. The phenomenon of using established 
regional forums, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the South Asia Association 
for Regional Cooperation, to aid in security is briefly discussed. The author’s finding 
that regional assistance can bring security supports my research and underpins my 
theory about cooperation and security. The debate over the roles of Afghanistan’s 
neighbours is ever-changing and my novel research will benefit society and academia at 
large, by providing an improved plan to benefit the region. 
 
The methodology of this article is constant with other articles in the security 
 
category, in that the main sources are analytical reasoning, and academic discussion and 
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theorizing. What is missing from the category at large, in my opinion, is actual 
fieldwork in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, Central Asia. This would expand on theory and 
analysis and would provide a more transparent and less biased approach to security 
solutions should a secure means of conducting this research be possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
Most literature focused on failures within the region and the effects of a failed 
state, not remedies. My research differs in that I will address these issues and seek to 
find a solution to the problems. My work goes one-step further by not merely 
criticizing, buy rebuffing weaknesses and attempting to build a solid, workable, and 
mutually acceptable plan. Facts, figures, opinions, and official ideology are important, 
as well as reflections on past experiences. A different approach to a different question 
is what I propose. 
 
What I have found so far is that there are three key topics which revolve around 
each other and are inherently co-dependent: Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations, Security, 
and Regionalism. All three are wide ranging and invite analysis of the situation in 
Afghanistan on multiple levels. The research could be narrowed down to smaller sub- 
sections; but to keep general at this time is best, as the commonality found and the 
overlapping of the three categories became very evident as more research was 
conducted. Without one there cannot be another, the cycle is self-reciprocating and 
certainly not self-contained. 
 
Absolutely everything is related between Afghanistan and its neighbours. The 
interests of Europe, the United States, and Saudi Arabia are important in the future, 
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even though these states do not share a geographical border with Afghanistan. From 
what I have uncovered so far, it can be noted that a border is not a wall or door to stop 
anything. A border is open no matter how secured it is, and, as such, all regional powers 
are very much linked with common problems and issues. What is positive is that many 
of these issues are shared and can be dealt with together, if my third way was possible. 
 
Proposing a third solution, a new idea which is neither US dominated, nor is 
purely a clone of failed past attempts is my goal. Drawing from historical context, 
theoretical framework, and a sampling of the research already conducted, I am aware of 
the key issues, established framework, and theory, as well as, the problems which await. 
I can analyse from the American, European, and Afghan point of view and believe this 
will help with research and finding solutions to important research questions. Through 
this literature review, I identified key variables, phenomena, and methods that will be 
useful in my continuing research. 
 
From here, the only way forward is to continue the research, modify my 
methods where necessary, and adapt to the ideas learned from my work so far. More 
research on the ground: at embassies, with senior officials, and with the people is 
needed. Academic research can only provide so much information. When combined 
these various research methods can provide the answers to my research questions and 
ideally affirm my hypothesis. 
 
If I can develop a roadmap for a modern, inclusive regional system to include all 
parties and their analysed interests, then I can also predict what the outcome will be for 
all involved. It also is important to look at other models and to strategize what would 
happen if there was no model, as things develop on a daily basis in Southwest Asia. 
 
The current research does not go far enough to propose a solution and current 
doctrine and strategy in Southwest Asia is not working. Something must be done for 
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the sake of the region and for academic debate on this issue. This is my goal, moving 
forward. 
 
Post conflict reconstruction as well as meaningful interstate links are vital to 
finding a regional solution for Afghanistan and Central Asia, Making a stronger Central 
Asia will in turn make a stronger Afghanistan if the region can bind together and solve 
the Afghan instability itself. If the prior regional effort failure factor can be reasonably 
identified then any future efforts to stabilize the nation and region will need to build on 
measurable prior successes, whilst improving on the failures of the past. The 
modification of past regionalism into a new form of integrated top down regionalism 
will create more than a patch to the problem of instability that ravages Afghanistan and 
threatens the region. 
 
This research aims to present a workable model for regional contribution leading 
to stability in Afghanistan, the rationale for this research paper to propose a well- 
defined regionalist role for the key powers, after the US and NATO withdrawal is the 
recognition that Afghanistan alone cannot sustain peace and stability. This hypothesis 
will be further analysed in this paper, but to understand why regionalism can be 
beneficial to Afghanistan, it bears investigating the history of regionalism itself. 
 
Joseph Nye defines regionalism as the formations of interstate associations or 
groupings on the basis of regions. Regionalism is further expanded by Harvard 
University to include economic links between nations from different regions, thus 
regionalism can be a regional focus by the wider international community, as well as the 
international relations between nation states in a specific region.
48  
Nye also breaks 
regionalist organizations down into two sub communities: micro economic 
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organizations and macro political/security organizations.
49  
What is thus necessary is a 
combination of the two theories is a good structure for a new model of regionalism and 
a central Asian security community. Micro-economic organizations serve a limited 
purpose, such as cooperation on matters such as agricultural output and sales, however, 
the limited role within the larger role is really what matters. Although a micro 
organization between traders may on the surface seem insignificant, such organizations 
build trust, mutual support and reliance. Economic links build trust, commerce and the 
wider economy. Such small economic agreements can foreshadow larger economic 
cooperation or can be formed as part of a wider umbrella of top down cooperation from 
the national macro level to the provincial micro level. In essence all actors play their 
part for their self-interest in a realist view, but within an international structure to 
achieve their own goals whilst these actors de-facto aid the larger nation and region 
through their actions and rational behaviour. The literature reveals that there is a real 
link between economic growth and security. This is riches creates security causal link 
can be applied to social science modelling. Through this modelling when international 
organizations and regional organizations are put alongside anarchy it can be seen that 
both the regional and macro security organizations seek security through stability. So 
what is a way to create this security and stability that is sought? There is a trifecta 
between economic development, security and international organizations. There needs 
to be some sort of regional cooperation in order to achieve stability in Central Asia. 
They each rely upon each other and stem from one another. You simply cannot have 
one without the other. They are intrinsically linked. This regionalist approach matches 
realist-institutional thought as objectives of both nation states, and non-state actors can 
be linked together to reach the end game objective that the state and region seeks, but 
this requires some master guidance and brokerage, hence the regional organization. 
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Although regionalism is not a ‘novel’ concept, the model I will propose will be a 
marked improvement on the generally accepted concept of regionalism, as applied to 
Afghanistan and central Asia.
50 
What this means is that my model of modern 
regionalism relies on focused regional efforts (from a variety of partners) in order to 
 
achieve measured goals. What is unique about this new model is that a hierarchy of 
acceptability is used to model the most acceptable levels of integration on common 
issues. Also a more inclusive approach is advocated, which diverges from the traditional 
use of regionalism in the area. Past incarnations of regionalism were mainly in the 
national self-interest, poorly coordinated or overly coordinated. There has been a great 
deal of discourse over existing, limited-scope, regional organizations in Central Asia. 
However, none of these current regional organizations have gone that step further and 
been either all inclusive or achieved measurable, long-term successes necessary for 
future stability. A quick regional effort is uncoordinated, whilst a long-term regional 
body is overly complicated and slow, and would be hard to catalyse in the security 
environment which currently engulfs Afghanistan. Thus, unplanned regionalism or 
long term planning and a supranational body, result in either weak results or over 
entanglement between nations, neither of which would be appropriate for Afghanistan. 
Universalism and regionalism have a role to play, but to sustain and engage a region at 
its core, a regional community is most appropriate as it is composed entirely of 
members of the area in which change is desired.
51  
What must be identified are the key 
factors that will make a workable model functional for Central Asia. There are key 
factors in the literature which are common themes and underpin regionalism. If these 
common factors can be applied in the model to support the social science model which 
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predicts the success of a regional solution then a functional, applicable regional model 
can be developed. 
 
Regionalism, historically, has had its successes and failures, and many scholars 
and politicians are divided over the usefulness of the doctrine. Examining a selection of 
past high profile regionalism efforts (which were either too weak or too strong) can 
result in data which explains how these prior examples of regional efforts are not 
appropriate for Central Asia. 
 
What is needed is a framework of an international organization or form of regional 
cooperation to aid in stabilizing the region. Different types or levels of international 
organization can bring different levels of rewards to the participants depending on the 
level of commitment needed from the participants. Integration is defined as, ‘the 
process whereby an international organization acquires the responsibility for taking an 
increasing number of decisions in areas which were previously reserved for the state.’
52
 
This is what makes regionalism inherently not an easy process to implement. There is 
always some give and take when integration takes place. This is true no matter the scale 
of the integration from the grass roots up to complex treaties and supranational bodies. 
There must be a reason for states to want to cede at least some power or the ability to 
make totally unilateral decisions on all points of interest for the ‘greater good’.  This 
ceding of power, or not reserving the right to act however a state wants, can be seen as a 
limitation, but it can also be seen as a benefit to the state. If states choose to cooperate 
they can gain benefits such as collective security in a security community type structure 
or economic market gains in a customs union or trade agreement. By ceding some 
choices states will gain benefits. Collaboration breeds cooperation over competition and 
each individual effort can be complimentary to the group at large. There must be a 
structure of organizations (a taxonomy) which ranks integration in international 
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organizations from most easily acceptable (and least integrated), to most challenging to 
get buy in from all members (most integrated). Integration can generally take two 
forms, direct transfer of sovereignty from national power to a supranational authority 
(like the European Union – the most integrated form of international organization), or a 
pooling of national sovereignty in a manner in which each state keeps control of 
national policy but cooperates together on certain international issues (as ASEAN does 
in Southeast Asia). Both types of international organization go beyond pure treaty 
agreements and act as a ‘community’ beyond the traditional Westphalian notion of the 
‘state’ and signify regional integration. Trade cooperation is the base level of an 
international organization. That is not to say that there is no regionalism on a scale 
smaller than a trade organization, however, the smaller pacts, agreements and accords 
serve a limited scope on a singular issue and cannot be seen as ‘regional integration’ on 
a larger scale. 
 
There is a place for these smaller niche agreements, and that is within the larger 
body of an international organization. The integration allows for better organization, 
dissemination, financing and administration of obligations. Historically, most regional 
integration efforts started as trade agreements, and this is true of the European Union, 
ASEAN, as well as the African Union, MERCOSUR and NAFTA. There organizations 
started as primarily trade only organizations but as trade and politics are intertwined, 
they grew to embody political and economic decisions. This market capitalization is 
what can lure states to organize together, knowing that the prospects for their own 
economy will grow with regional cooperation and organization, as is the way in the ever 
more integrated economic-political globalized world.
53  
Regionalism in Central Asia 
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can be characterized by the coming together of less developed countries to gradually 
cope with the competition of cooperation and divergent regional powers. Thus 
cooperating together is better than working against one another, as each state stands to 
benefit from cooperation. So in our classification of different levels of International 
organizations the hardest to get consensus on, being the most integrated, is the fully 
inclusive supranational system, of which the EU is the best example.
54 
The easiest is the 
 
strategic dialogue, such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
essentially this is a forum for discussing joint efforts, but with little formal organs and 
thus no effective means of administration or enforcement, it is essentially a group of 
goodwill and although it is very easy to encourage this type of agreement, they have been 
referred to as a ‘talking shop’. Not that regional dialogue is a bad thing, but for our 
purposes this research seeks to find a workable regional model for Central Asia, and an 
entry level discussion does not go far enough to achieve this. Some theorists like Charles 
Pentland have advocated for a ‘third’ level of regional integration. That middle layer, 
which is still acceptable and accessible to nation states, but which strikes a 
balance between domestic interests and external interests and interactions with other 
states in a community.
55
 
 
A security community would be one such type of this integration as would a 
more advanced version of this community would be reflected in the policies of a 
regional community which does not reach the integration extent of a full supranational 
state, but which has checks and balances and acts as a community, similar to ASEAN. 
This falling under the definition of, ‘the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of 
community …with institutions…and practices.’56 This forms a security community or 
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an amalgamation, which is multiple states working through some common government 
or body.  As previously stated this middle layer, between the full supranational state and 
the mere treaty is what the ideal medium is. There is a balance between being 
acceptable, not requiring certain norms of behaviour or loss of sovereignty which may 
not be acceptable to many states and no judgment of internal actions and politics in 
nation states. This type of model can be the security community, the trade community, 
or the loose political international organization. 
 
Four stages of integration have been defined by economist Bela Balassa, the first 
being a free trade area: the removal of trade restrictions offering the most immediate 
pay off for any actor willing to participate. The next stage is the process of setting up a 
customs union, a common customs area where goods are not taxed from one nation to 
the next, allowing nations to compliment and not necessarily compete with each other 
producing the same goods. The third stage is a common market and finally an economic 
union.
57 
Whilst the latter two are hard to envision in the current state of affairs in 
Central Asia, it must be recalled that whilst many entry level organizations start as trade 
agreements, they tend to develop and mature over time into deeper connections and as 
such any baseline is a positive. Having established the order in which regional 
institutions rank in order of ease of adaption to Central Asia, 1) base level – NGO’s and 
foreign aid, 2) regional treaties of cooperation, 3) security community/economic 
organization/customs union, 4) supranational institution, it is noteworthy that for 
regional integration to really be useful institutions are necessary (even in the level 3 
cooperation) as they provide guidance and ‘commitment institutes’ that hold actors to 
the agreement they assent to. This is necessary to ensure the validity and purpose of the 
regional cooperation.
58 
The reason that integration is difficult is that it is inherently a 
process, ‘whereby political actors in distinct national settings are persuaded to sift their 
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national loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing states.’59 In any 
regional effort there has to be a certain amount of decision making seceded to the 
regional body. Although cooperation requires the state to not act in anyway it so wishes, 
the state still benefits. That means that although the state may not wish to cooperate, but 
doing so, it still meets its own self-interest. Regional integration is mainly due to the 
demand and supply needs. The demand for regional rules, regulations and policies are 
determined by the market.
60  
It has been remarked by Palmer that ‘conceptualization 
and encouragement of other forms of cooperation that was less intensive but of a more 
 
realizable nature’ is an acceptable way to sell regional integration ab-initio.61  To create 
a successful regional effort, regional cooperation should build on less controversial 
issues towards issues of increasing complexity due to the fact that consensus is easier to 
achieve on base issues. For nation states to accept regional cooperation they must focus 
on cooperation and not fear integration. Domestic factors are also supremely important 
in regional efforts.
62  
Can the regional body accept the domestic issues in the member 
state? If so then the state can cooperate without fear, at first, of judgment. Focus again, 
must be on the benefits of cooperation in an international organization and not on the 
potential future integration.
63  
On a pure numbers game, integration is in the favour of 
the economies of Central Asia. How to best sell it to the nation states is simple: appeal 
to their common prosperity and national self-interests. 
 
If Central Asia was to create joinder of policy on counter terror and counter 
narcotics, big issues, which affect all the nations in the region then not only would it be 
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a gain for the region, but also for the bigger powers who would be convinced to back 
such an agreement as it is also in their interests. Although big power backing is not a 
necessity, having multiple big powers respect the sovereignty and purposefulness of the 
new regional organization would be beneficial for two reasons. Primarily, the 
organization would be seen as legitimate and thus would build political clout as well as 
potential funding, and secondly, the encouragement may be necessary in the early days 
of formation, since historically Central Asia has had limited success with forming a 
Central Asian ‘unit’ without any big power backing.
64  
A variety of intra-regional and 
 
state level factors have created a propensity for regionalism in security and other fields 
as an immediate need in Central Asia, which could in turn lead to closer cooperation on 
other issues of ‘soft power’.65 Regional cooperation has been accomplished in the past 
but never to a successful or meaningful extent. Of course, there are not many factors 
which contribute to that let alone the facts that no regional organization has ever 
involved all members of Central Asia, nor has any effort ever been an organic Central 
Asian effort. Notwithstanding, there is direct evidence that cooperation is an option and 
this desire and ability to contribute in limited ways to an international grouping has 
been demonstrated through cooperation with NGO’s, The United States, The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization to name a few all the way back to the 1992 Tashkent 
Collective Security treaty.
66 
Security agreements present the most obvious reason to 
collaborate aside from the equally important economics of trade agreements. A security 
community is only as strong as those who contribute and in the past Central Asian states 
have agreed to provide troops
67 
to support such a collective security policy, however, 
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such agreements have yet to mature beyond mere infancy, mainly due to poor funding, 
lack of leadership, commitment and being non Central Asian controlled organizations, 
and thus missing the regional ‘buy in’ required for a community to be successful. 
 
The factors identified in the research for successful regionalism are international 
organizations, economic development and security. These three factors presented 
themselves multiple times throughout the literature and form the paragon to apply to 
Central Asia. Applying this model with the recognized inherent political diversity in 
central Asia, I propose a concerted and focused effort in an exercise in modern 
regionalism between the states mutual benefit. The EU is a shining example of the 
successes of regionalism, yet it is too supranational to neatly be replicated at once in 
Central Asia. There is simply too much to accept with that model. The positive though 
is that the benefits exerted by the EU can help frame a new model for a security 
community in central Asia. For example, in 2007 the EU established a Central Asia 
partnership strategy.
68 
While the strategy is far from all encompassing, it did open a 
 
dialogue on pan central Asian strategic aims and government initiatives. The EU 
essentially has sowed the seeds for cooperation that are necessary for a new security 
community, and has established the foundation for regional cooperation in a loose, 
acceptable manner. What remains a challenge is to make the dialogue, more than a 
strategic partnership for peace, and more of a semi-permanent organization, whilst 
remaining palatable to member states. This will be a formidable challenge, yet the 
effect groundwork the EU has set up is significant and promising, as well as the promise 
of close EU / future security community cooperation to increase effectiveness (and 
funding). There is thus desire to cooperate in Central Asia. This is the keystone in the 
security community theory and also a main factor in the realist and liberal institutional 
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approach to international organizations. With this basic will to enter talks comes the 
lowest level of international organization taxonomy. The grass roots of regional 
cooperation. From this strategic dialogue there can be seen a will to want to share 
common problems and solve them. The need for balanced multipolarity
69 
is essential if 
cooperation is to take place, and the willingness to discuss international cooperation is 
demonstrative of this. 
 
Research in this project has indicated that to create a successful regional 
organization there must be 3 key factors available. 1) There must be a will to genuinely 
cooperate between member states, 2) there must be a forum for member states to 
participate in conferences and caucuses and 3) there must be goodwill in the form of 
funding, participation and national recognition of the supranational authority of the 
regional organization. These factors fit with the trifecta factors identified throughout the 
research. There are many models available for application to Central Asia. The question 
is which model works best. The answer is a hybrid that can take into account the 
different types of governance in Central Asia, the political acceptance of such a body and 
the integration process. 
 
These three factors are not hypothetical; rather, they are the three most common 
forces seen in functioning and legitimate regional bodies such as the EU and ASEAN. It 
can also be said that without all three of these factors on the side of the new regional 
body, looking through a realist framework, the body is doomed to failure. Take the 
League of Nations without US participation and ratification. This lack of American 
participation and ‘buy in’ by the national government caused a lack of general legitimacy 
leading to non-participation by Germany and Japan, and the leagues failure. 
Had the US have recognized and participated in the League of Nations, it may well have 
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been seen by the world as a legitimate governing body, and may have developed better 
rules, guidelines and norms. These very ideological concepts, or norms, are the regional 
communities’ identity, mission statement and sword and shield. Norm building grants 
authority and a deeper acceptance of the regional organization. Without actual 
legitimacy or a desire to participate by member states, a regional body is but a forum 
where ideas are loosely exchanged. For example, the Warsaw pact
70 
was a forced 
 
security community
71 
in which member states had very little input
72
. This alternate type 
of regional model is not appropriate as it is not acceptable and has no means of 
enforcement in Central Asia. It was such an unpopular model that when its member 
states had the opportunity to defect and turn towards the west for economic and stability 
reasons, they left and even joined NATO; demonstrating the power of an organization 
of equal input and recognition, which does not control its members by force and fear.
73
 
 
For Central Asia, something more concrete is necessary if the region is to set goals of 
economic regeneration, prosperity, trade, and security. All must genuinely want 
progress in order for progress to come, on any plane. 
 
Chapter III.  International Relations of Central Asia 
 
The international relations of Central Asia as the status quo are key to 
understanding any future security community or regional concert in Central Asia. The 
manner in which the states interact with each other sets the tone for the interest in 
developing both a regional security community and for regional cooperation on 
grassroots issues. 
 
 
 
70 
Joan Bird, ed., ‘CIA Analysis Of The Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance Of Clandestine Reporting’, 
CIA, 1-56. 
71 
‘The Warsaw Pact, 1955,’ Fordham University, 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html, accessed 28 Mar. 2013. 
‘Avalon Project: The Warsaw Pact’, Yale Law School (n.d). 
72 
‘The Warsaw Pact: Czechoslovakia’, Library of Congress, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/czechoslovakia/cs_appnc.html, accessed 28 Mar. 2013. 
73 
Fred Eidlin, ‘The Initial Political Failure of the Warsaw Pact Intervention in Czechoslovakia of 21 
August 1968’, East Central Europe 5 (1978), 245-66. 
66 
 
3.1 India 
 
 
Although India is not geographically part of Central Asia, Indian influence in 
Central Asia is a constant, and thus acknowledgment of Indian capabilities and 
limitations should be examined. There are already countless instances of cooperation 
between the regional states already, for example India, which is a strong regional power 
in itself is actively engaged in the redevelopment of Afghanistan. Is this due to a selfish 
state interest in undermining Pakistan? Quite possibly, however, it does belie an effort 
to cooperate even if in the self-interest, in keeping with neo-realist theory. Cooperation 
is a tangible goal, which is prima facie evidence of building relations. The rationale for 
the cooperation is almost immaterial. What matters is the measurable progress in 
creating a safer, more stable Afghanistan. Indian companies have already significantly 
contributed to the development of Afghan infrastructure, which in turn, leads to 
industry, and jobs, and thus stability, in theory of course. Indian companies are actively 
engaged in road building, and have invested over 1.3 billion USD in aid already.
74  
In 
fact, India was the only nation, which allowed the Northern Alliance; counter Taliban 
forces an actual embassy. India cites civilizational links for its desire to build cultural 
and economic links with Afghanistan, and this nation building is what is required to 
build greater links across the region at large. Of course, the downside to Indian interest 
in Afghanistan is the Pakistani factor. Pakistan considers Afghanistan its traditional 
realm and does not care for Indian ‘interference’ no matter, the rationale. The regional 
organization needs to find a way to temper these Indian-Pakistani flare-ups or focus on 
one or the other to avoid aggression. Of course, It can be seen that an Indian interest in 
Afghan security if in concert with a Pakistani effort could really sure up defences and 
security as a large regional power has certain abilities smaller states do not. 
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‘A more robust Indian military role in Afghanistan represents one of the best 
ways to advance New Delhi’s strategic interests while fostering Kabuls’ continued 
security and economic development after U.S and NATO forces begin to withdraw in 
2014.’ Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, RAND senior policy analysts, in Hindustan 
 
Times, July 11, 2012.
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Having discussed Indian actions in Afghanistan there must be a counter balance 
to the large regional power from the east. That counterbalance comes in the form of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is a regional power in its own right and has a vast swath 
of influence over much of what goes on in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. As 
such, engagement of this large power is exactly what the Central Asian region needs. 
Of course, like India, Iran’s decision to get involved in Afghan reconstruction is not 
entirely selfless. This real politik fits with the theoretical framework established by the 
research, indicating that the willingness to cooperate can still exist, even though the 
reason for the cooperation is entirely for selfish reasons. The bottom line with India 
relations is that although at first any relations with India seem unthinkable due to 
Pakistan’s long standing aggression with India. However, it can be argued that until a 
détente can be reached with Indian relations via a regional body, there must be 
independent interaction with Afghanistan and India in order to build a more robust 
Afghanistan and expended links with Central Asia. The essence of the relationship is 
that India possesses a large amount of skills, which can be beneficial to Afghanistan and 
greater central Asia. This central tenant of regional cooperation for greater good, in 
order to expand regional markets both ways, and to introduce newer infrastructure and 
 
security is expounded in the following; 
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‘The people of Afghanistan want to lay down their Kalashnikovs and take up 
spades. Instead of tanks, we want to see tractors ploughing the fields of Afghanistan.’76 
 
India and Afghanistan have already signed grassroots cooperation agreements on 
agriculture and education. Furthermore, the leaders of India and Afghanistan have both 
shown their determination to commit to cross border regional relations, in that they have 
publically stated that they hope that 
 
‘India and Pakistan and Afghanistan, can work together to fight the menace of 
terrorism…I very much hope that we can joint hands to fight this menace.’77  President 
Karzai’s musings on relations between AF-PAK and India belie a sense of cooperation 
which has been missing from the region for so long, one which can only come from the 
needs of the states, not something which can just be imposed by outside actors. The 
need to cooperate is going to have to overcome potential tensions between Pakistan and 
India, as some have commented that ‘Indian involvement in Afghanistan could further 
raise tensions in Indo-Pak relations’, however, the common good and both states 
interests in countering terror and grow economics should balance the power. 
 
Any integration process in Afghanistan should be Afghan- 
led, and should include … those who abjure violence, give 
up armed struggle and terrorism and are willing to abide by 
the values of democracy, pluralism and human rights as 
enshrined in the Afghan Constitution….India would like to 
expand its role in the South Asia region, and accepts a 
regional arrangement for rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan 
with close cooperation of other nations. However, Pakistan 
has expressed opposition to the creation of a regional body 
which will oversee the economic and security situation in 
Afghanistan. India would also hope for the various ethnic 
divisions of Afghanistan to cooperate with each other to 
ensure sustainable peace in Afghanistan. India has also 
expressed interests in the large natural gas reserves in Iran, 
and may decide to build a natural gas pipeline through 
Afghanistan….  It is also in India’s interests to prevent 
corruption within  the  Afghan  government, and  seeks  to 
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strengthen democracy in  Afghanistan and  has  also 
expressed  its  desire  to  abolish  the  illicit  cultivation  of 
opium in Afghanistan, as it is a method by which the 
Taliban raises funds. Methods that may be taken to reduce 
this could include but are not limited to increasing security 
in  areas  where opium is  grown,  incentivizing the 
production of other cash crops, establishing fair trade 
systems to ensure profitability for farmers, and promoting 
education and awareness in Afghanistan.
78
 
As can be seen the promotion of stability through security apparatus, economic 
growth, and education, and trade is a key factor in India’s approach to Afghanistan and 
Central Asia. This concurs with the hypothesis of this research paper, and further more 
consolidates the grounded theory that the central tenants of regional cooperation should 
be economics, security and common threads where cooperation is mutually beneficial. 
The example of reducing the drug trade between the states is one; another is natural gas 
pipelines, just some of the many common themes which can be seen throughout the 
international relations of central Asia-at-large and Afghanistan. These recurring 
examples of willing cooperation which populate over and over again when discussing 
the neighboring states of Afghanistan are the issues which need to be explored in depth 
between the states in a regional cooperation agreement, as these very reasons for 
cooperation will feed each state’s own self-interest and thus produce buy-in and mutual 
 
support. The Trump administrations own policies towards Indian engagement in 
 
Afghanistan have been revealed through a Department of Defense Policy Paper entitled 
 
Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan
79
. In that policy paper, the US 
 
government has labeled India as ‘Afghanistan’s most reliable regional partner80’. India 
 
has much to offer in terms of economic engagement and a long and storied history of 
 
democracy and public order. If India can harness these exports and sell them to 
 
Afghanistan with US backing and assistance, positive gains can be made in 
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Afghanistan. The ‘brain trust’ India offers is immeasurable, India’s economy also offers 
 
a large marketplace for Afghan goods and services. Of course, India is keen as always 
 
to see how the Trump administration involves Pakistan, and may remain uncommitted 
 
until they see a clear US and Afghan preference for Indian assistance. India and 
 
Afghanistan have signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) for the purposes of 
 
re-development and stabilization. In 2017, the partnership announced a US$1 Billion 
 
Indian investment in Afghanistan
81
. The Indian government has an interest in re-settling 
 
Afghan refugees and is investing in healthcare, industry (notably Gypsum), and housing 
 
in an effort to make the nation more stable and self-sufficient. India is utilizing soft 
 
power similar to the Chinese and through their investment vs actual large security 
 
presence
82
, their strategic goals can be predicted to be more economic than territorial, 
 
and the Indian influence and investment can be accepted easier by those in Afghanistan, 
 
especially as India is following an ASEAN style non-judgmental approach to support 
 
for Afghanistan
83
. India’s goals as of 2018 have been to influence Afghanistan security 
 
and the economy as a counter balance to Pakistani extremist influence, and to gain 
 
access to energy markets in greater Central Asia through their positive links made in 
cooperation to access the region
84
. 
3.2 Iran 
 
According to the US Department of Defence
85
, Iran remains very interested in 
Afghanistan’s future. Iran has invested in the economy and in transport links, and has 
signed the Chabahar deep-water port agreement with Afghanistan and India, which will 
allow supply access without transiting Pakistan. This has the potential to open up a new 
world of commerce and business for Afghanistan. Iran is actively engaging in cultural, 
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religious, and intergovernmental relations. Iran’s first strategic goals are to increase its 
 
own influence over American influence, to counter ISIS and to protect the Shia 
 
communities living in Afghanistan. Continuing US and Iranian power struggles in the 
 
Middle East and west Asia, do not increase cooperation between the two states in 
 
Afghanistan, but further complicate goals. As such, the Afghan strategy with Iran 
 
should be direct and without American influence, whilst simultaneously engaging the 
 
two large powers in the regional forum in order to combine resources and prevent proxy 
 
wars and inefficient dispersal of funding and development skewed by national interest. 
 
 
Iran has in the past offered to ‘help the US rebuild Afghanistan’ according the 
 
Guardian newspaper. Mohammad Mehdi, Iranian delegate to the International 
 
Conference on Afghanistan in the Hague said: 
 
Welcoming the proposals for join cooperation offered by 
the countries contributing to Afghanistan, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is fully prepared to participate in the 
projects aimed at combating drug trafficking and plans in 
line with developing and reconstructing Afghanistan.
86
 
 
Cooperation with Iran, a major regional power, would carry with it certain risk- 
 
rewards. That is to say that any cooperation with Iran would be at Iran’s invitation as 
 
that state has more to offer in its relationship. As such, and as has been seen in current 
 
events, Iran would seek to further its own aims in the region through any cooperative 
 
agreement. This of course fits with the theory of realism, and should not be seen as a 
 
solely negative rationale for cooperation. However, due to modern trends with Iran, 
 
cooperation with the US is highly unlikely. 
 
What is needed is real input, fiscally and politically to stabilize the region, build 
bridges (both theoretical and actual), and improve trade and commerce. A powerful state 
like Iran could significantly contribute to the region and to Afghanistan specifically. 
Iran has a long history of counter Taliban interests and has always sought 
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to prevent the Taliban from gaining power as this Taliban influence threatens both 
Iranian security and interests. Trade wise, Iran could be one of the largest trading 
partners with Afghanistan and would effectively have an extremely large market share 
of foodstuffs, and electronics as the domestic Iranian market produces many of the 
goods that the domestic Afghan market is in need of. Iranian technical expertise in 
manufacturing, business growth, economics and technology would be tremendously 
helpful to Afghanistan and to other central Asian states if the economics of cooperation 
allowed a growth in cross border trade and knowledge, something which a regional 
organization would have to consider as part of its growth. Furthermore, Iran has grown 
and developed their economy in relative isolation due to decades old sanctions from the 
United States and Europe. 
 
However, Iran has still managed to develop an organic economy, provide jobs, 
and business ownership opportunities as well as reduce its poverty level to almost half 
that in Afghanistan.
87 
This is important as the true tangible benefit, which can come from 
Iranian-Central Asian cooperation, and specifically Iranian-Afghani cooperation is 
economic growth. Although this is not an essay on economics, the Chinese foreign 
investment model encouraging joint risk, and joint ownership by joint venture 
corporations would be a good starting ground to explore economic investment.
88
 
 
Although over the course of the past decade, Iran has not been a partner, in any 
respect, to the United States or NATO in Afghanistan, It seems that geopolitics have 
made a paradigm shift across the rubicon in recent times. Primarily, this shift away 
from conflict only with Iran toward more open options has been demonstrated through 
the inclusion of Iran in regional discussions on the Taliban, along with Iranian 
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expressions of a desire to be better involved in Afghanistan’s future, in order to counter 
 
the mutual enemy, the Taliban. Back in 2009, US Secretary of defence Gates 
 
commented that “‘Iran is unhelpful in many, many ways, so I wouldn’t be overly 
 
optimistic at this point but there are mutual interests that I think might offer some 
 
possibilities.”89 
 
 
However, times were changing, and with the Iran nuclear deal, came a thawing 
 
of relations between the two powers, and the opportunity to open a window to greater 
 
economic and security cooperation in Afghanistan and central Asia. However, this 
 
window appears to have closed as the new US administration has no desire to work 
 
alongside Iran. Indeed, even without any US support or direct involvement in fostering 
 
a regional community or regional relations, Iran has a long standing desire to keep the 
 
Taliban from coming back to power, as the Taliban threatens Iran at a distance as a 
 
destabilizing power, and is outwardly hostile to Iranian interests in Afghanistan. 
 
Currently, Iran is very engaged in countering the influence of ISIS and this includes in 
 
Central Asia. This is important for Iranian foreign affairs and domestic security to see 
 
an ISIS free or contained region. This along with narcotics cooperation presents the 
 
most accessible transborder issues for cooperation. Economically, Iran is further tied to 
 
Afghanistan than ever, with its 2018 rise to largest trading partner, sending over US$ 2 
 
billion across the border per year. This strengthening of ties with Afghanistan bodes 
 
well for future relations, and Iranian cooperation and support for strong Central Asian 
 
regimes which hold the security of the region as a priority
90
. Iran has invested in 
 
transport links and economic programs with Tajikistan, energy projects with 
 
Turkmenistan and Security projects with Uzbekistan and is seemingly supportive of 
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regional cooperation for stability
91
. Security is the main goal of Iranian policy it seems 
 
and this desire for cooperation to achieve this is well justified
92
. A counter to this notion 
 
is that even though Iran is fundamentally opposed to Taliban and ISIS extremism, they 
 
have been known to support groups waging war against US troops in order to rid the 
 
region of US influence, which is perplexing considering the strategic goals of Iran, yet 
 
meets their short term Tactical goals. As such, it is presupposed that without the US in 
 
Afghanistan Iran may be more rational regarding inciting limited regional aggression
93
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Pakistan 
 
 
Tracing the history of Pakistani involvement in Central Asia in its modern form, 
former US Secretary of Defense Gates has spoken of regional cooperation and this is 
expressed through the Taliban negotiations in which Gates has said that regional 
neighbours, primarily Pakistan should be involved in. Taking this one step further, if 
Iran, as well as other neighbours were included, the representation would be pan-central 
Asian and would offer Afghanistan and the surrounding region future prospects. This 
doctrine of inclusion fits along with structural functionalist theory, and also appeals to 
conservative doctrine, as mutual cooperation on certain matters of deep interest to every 
states national core, necessitates a chain reaction to cooperate for each states own self- 
interest. Also as the international system in Afghanistan and Central Asia is so raw, the 
power vacuum needs to be filled. Like India, and Iran, although Pakistan is not a 
Central Asian state within the scope of this research it can be examined as a player in 
 
Central Asian International Relations as it is an influencer, a regional counter balance to 
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Indian power in Central Asia and a traditional actor in Central Asian politics when 
incorporating Afghanistan. 
 
The United States Department of Defence has been strong on headlining AF- 
PAK relations to the maximum extent, as the two are recognized by the United States as 
being intrinsically linked, not just culturally and linguistically, but also through a porous 
border. This linkage of the nations through large land borders is what needs to be 
underlined and capitalized on, going forward. These same links need to be explored and 
exploited in regard to the other central Asian neighbours and regional powers that see 
themselves as neighbours, such as India. 
 
The desire to cooperate and invest in Afghanistan for self-serving needs is not 
only good for the two states in that bilateral relationship, but also for unintentional 
multilateralism through building stability, economic growth, and trade and transport 
links which has a knock on effect of growing regional confidence and security. This 
benefits everyone. I do not think this can be emphasized enough, even in the face of the 
doubtful. It is a simple fact that cooperation between nations builds trust, and this trust 
is important to build further relations and can be contagious to others who also wish to 
continue their links with Afghanistan. 
 
“Pakistan, Afghanistan should make good friends not bad neighbours”94 This Chinese 
government official media outlet statement on AF-PAK relations is the best way to lead 
into that regional act. Indeed, Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked by AF-PAK, and this 
needs to be expounded upon. The relationship waxes and wanes, but the fact remains 
that the two states need each other to be following similar tracks for mutual benefits. 
When one state stumbles, the other intrinsically also suffers, and this is not good for the 
people of either state, or the region at large. 
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There is a fine power balance between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and all 
indications are that this has always been, and will always be the case. What that does 
not mean though is that cooperation is off the table. This balance of power is just a 
historical norm for the relations of those nations. The historic inequities and 
disagreements over borders, certain rights, and treaties do need to be addressed, yes, but 
the gravitas of the two states relationship should also be underlined. This is a powerful 
relationship, and is one which will continue to flux the region and influence regional 
cooperation from other powers, such as India, who requires multilateral engagement in 
order to reach Afghanistan economically, by road, for instance. 
 
According to Pakistan’s President, “there is a need for improving the level of 
cooperation between the two countries.”95 This is something which is not only being 
addressed by Afghanistan and Pakistan but is actively being pursued by India, China, 
and the former ISAF and current Freedom’s Sentinel nations. In fact, the cooperation 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan is seem as so paramount to Afghan and regional 
stabilization and growth that Freedom’s Sentinel has formed its own regional agenda 
which is as follows: 
 
Freedom’s Sentinel contributing nations: 
 
• Calls on Afghanistan’s neighbours to act resolutely in support of the Afghan 
governments efforts to build a stable Afghanistan with secure borders; 
 
 
 
• Looks forward to deepening their engagement with Afghanistan’s 
neighbours, particularly Pakistan; 
 
 
• Supports efforts to improve security and stability along the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border; 
 
 
• Encourages further cooperation and intensified dialogue between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan including through Jirga mechanisms, the Ankara 
process and the tripartite commission. 
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Through these mechanisms, there is a reflection on regionalism, why regionalism 
is needed is self-evidenced in the strategic outlook above. Cooperation breeds security 
and dialogue. A Major General has commented, “Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
increasing their substantial support to stabilize the security situation along their borders 
but much more needs to be done. 
96” This statement is also echoed by the Chinese and 
Americans. The big take away is that border security is a key issue and this fits with the 
common themes of cooperation identified by this research paper. Find a common ground 
to cooperate on and interaction will occur. There has to be genuine mutual desire to 
accomplish mutually beneficial goals, though, any progress is still 
progress. 
 
 
The problem is that there are hundreds of different agendas and strategic goals 
being executed in a non-organized and decentralized manner. This is chaotic, 
unorganized, lacks clarity, and is not efficient. Much more can be accomplished through 
open, notorious, and organized central efforts, like through the regional body I propose. 
This central authority would be a marketplace for ideas, debates, and progress; 
something, which is distinctly lacking from today’s random unilateral and bilateral 
relations in the region. 
 
General Masood of Pakistan believes that Pakistan will have to make a lot of 
efforts, not just the military effort, to bring peace and tranquillity in these areas [border 
areas], to make economic development and to provide the people there with better 
security, more employment opportunities and a greater emphasis on education, health 
and security. This attitude is tremendously positive and demonstrates the ability to want 
to be viable. Pakistan is in a very malleable state currently, as US aid has been frozen 
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due to perceived lack of response to terrorism, and Pakistan-Afghanistan arguments have 
been flaring over everything from water to trans border terrorism. However, Pakistan 
now has a new government as of 2018 and has the chance to seek rapprochement with 
Afghanistan, the US and further work with China in order to get back to the negotiating 
table with the Taliban, moving forward
97
. In Pakistan the situation remains fluid, and 
largely unpredictable. However, Pakistan has recently recognized that India and Pakistan 
share a mutual ‘responsibility’ along with other regional powers and the US in finding a 
solution to stability in broader Central Asia and Afghanistan in general
98
. 
 
This cooperative responsibility approach can be mirrored to other neighbours in 
their endeavours with Afghanistan. Job creation, pride, security, and economic 
prosperity are what are needed and these can only be accomplished with the aid of 
neighbours and regional powers. 
 
Aside from borders, Pakistan and Afghanistan also have a mutual need to 
improve economic ties, security, and counter narcotics. These simple foundation level 
cooperation areas are common throughout Central Asia, and these are the issues that 
warrant primacy. The compounding issue with Pakistani relations is that Afghans seek 
a fair, equal friendship, whereas some in the Pakistani establishment seek to influence 
and almost govern Afghanistan by proxy. Afghanistan needs friends, not masters.
99 
The 
Afghan people have put up with occupation for too long. It does not work. They need 
change, and they need it now for their sake and the region. There is a very direct 
relationship in place between Central Asia and Pakistan (Tajikistan and Pakistan already 
cooperate deeply regarding energy resources
100
). The relationship is symbiotic as 
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Pakistan lacks energy, but has a deep-water port, which the Central Asian states lack 
 
and need. As such, the two can cooperate for mutual benefit and if following the non- 
 
judgmental ASEAN model, each can go about their business without fear of 
interference, which is much easier to accept versus a top down model of control
101
. 
 
What is clear is that the status quo is not satisfactory, and Pakistan as well as the 
other regional states need to step up to counter the threat of militancy whilst upgrading 
and integrating the Afghan economy into the regional and world economic system. An 
outlier is dangerous, to itself and those around it. Change is necessary. But for change 
economically, you need security. 
 
For security apparatus, and political stability you need financing and political 
support. In short it is a cyclical process that is not possible without buy in. There is 
already support, but the backing of major players like Pakistan is necessary to further 
the goals of both states. Pakistan has much influence in the region and with the Taliban 
and can be either a highly divisive force, or a highly useful ally. Pakistani true support 
is necessary, possibly more than any other nation in the region, due to the weight of the 
links between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
102
 
 
Afghanistan’s desired profile in the region is as the 
pivotal state in a new network of trading and energy 
relationships between Central and  South and  East Asia. 
This objective is realistic, but until the country stabilizes 
and a significant political dimension is added to the 
government’s economic strategy, Afghanistan is likely to 
remain a marginal transit state rather than an integral and 
active component of the regional security complex.
103
 
 
As such, it is clear that other political thinkers are in concurrence that 
Afghanistan can become a regional hub for trade and economic links; however, the 
cooperation of neighbours, regional powers, and Afghanistan itself is required in full 
 
101 
Faisal Javaid and Asghar Ali Dashti, ‘Relations between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics: An 
Analysis’, Maarif Research Journal (2016), 67-78. 
102 
Daniel Dombey and Matthew Green, ‘US Aims to Turn Afghanistan into Neutral Zone’, Financial 
Times (June 27, 2011). 
103 
‘Afghanistan's Regional Diplomacy’, 1-2. 
80 
 
faith. The whole spectrum of international affairs needs to be addressed in the re- 
imagined Afghanistan regional relations sphere, from Iranian and Indian road building 
projects to rekindling the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan energy pipeline project 
from the 1990’s.104  Turkmenistan for instance has many cultural and linguistic links to 
Afghanistan and is a regional source of energy exploration and processing. Harvesting 
this energy growth and transporting the energy through Afghanistan and to the sub- 
continent would be a net growth item for all the states involved. 
 
The same could be argued for Iranian oil and electricity as well as water from 
other central Asian republics. Matters of cooperation such as this are paramount to a 
solid foundation of economic growth, links, and progress. Mutually beneficial 
multinational projects provide a carrot for the nations involved. The mutual 
profitability, which can be attained, acts as the driving force behind the cooperation and 
provides a self-sustaining interest in continued cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 China 
 
 
Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China have been engaged in a 
quadrilateral trade and transit agreement since 2004, this is promising and demonstrates 
that cooperation is possible, and although this agreement is limited in scope and does not 
incorporate Afghanistan, and other key regional states, it does show the willingness for 
nation states to cooperate for mutual benefit.
105
 
The agreement also provides a building block for further growth, and 
interestingly enough incorporates China, which is a large regional power that exerts 
influence in an economic, rather than military means. This Chinese approach to regional 
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influence in an area which China considers to be of priority due to their own struggles 
with militant Islamism and transnational crime and proliferation of narcotics is wildly 
different from the American and western direct approach to addressing such issues. The 
Chinese foreign policy is an aggressive policy designed to secure Chinese borders and 
military interests throughout Asia and the Pacific. 
 
 
Since around 2014 China has been actively engaged in a policy termed ‘The Silk 
 
Road Economic Belt”. By 2019 the initiative has been instituted in full force and 
 
highway building and construction projects are well under way around Central Asia, 
 
mimicking China’s soft power approach to Africa and the South Pacific. The project 
 
promotes both China’s interests and infrastructural and economic development across 
 
Eurasia. The belt also echo’s China’s goals of security through cooperation and 
 
economic development. A criticism of the belt has been that although the belt builds 
 
regional integration, it could also act to keep regional strong men in charge, as it is non- 
 
judgmental (like ASEAN – who are a cooperation partner in the belt program) in its 
 
approach to development
106
. This is a good Segway to the alternate theory of regional 
 
illiberalism, where a larger organization administers development and collective 
 
security cooperation, but where individual nation states maintain their sovereignty and 
 
continue with authoritarian policy to keep ‘the peace’ as such. This is wildly different 
 
from western views of development, however, the past 18 years have taught many that 
 
western cultural imperialism and beliefs are simply not directly applicable to Central 
 
Asia. 
 
 
China also seeks to influence affairs in certain regions of interest, such as 
 
Central Asia and Africa, through intense economic investment and use of human 
 
capital. This so-called ‘soft power’ is actually much better received and provides deeper 
 
intrinsic and institutional penetration than traditional western power plays. The simple 
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lack of open aggression is the one factor, which differentiates the western and eastern 
 
approaches to influence. The Chinese are thus better able to slowly penetrate cultural 
 
and 
 
 
 
Afghan society has been militarized by decades of war, starting with the 1979 
Soviet invasion. Since then, they have lived with ‘total war’107, non-conventional war, 
civil war, and the hybrid 4
th 
generation warfare that is still ongoing in the nation. This is 
exactly the problem and a major stumbling block to modernization, reforms; trust in the 
government, and economic growth. There needs to be reconciliation, and rehabilitation 
of all facets of society, including the Taliban. The only way to achieve this is through 
soft power, and incentives. The Chinese method is strong, in that it is pervasive and 
tolerable. Regional cooperation like this is non-judgmental along the ASEAN method 
and is thus acceptable to all parties. UN resolution 1267 imposed sanctions on the 
Taliban on 15 October 1999,
108 
and isolated and radicalized the movement even more. 
Such isolation and fractionalization is highly undesirable moving forward, and lessons 
learned from this international buffering of Afghanistan from the world and its own 
neighborhood should be actively avoided in order to encourage growth in economics 
 
and stability from within. This is exactly what the Chinese seem to be doing, providing 
an inclusive relationship with little formality, which allows growth and sustainment. 
Expanding this type of penetrative growth through deeper connection is highly 
desirable. Washington itself has been pushing a “New Silk Road” initiative109 for a 
number of years now, and with increasing Central Asian and regional power support it 
could become a reality, leading to more entrenched regionalism. China has in fact been 
pursuing regionalism in Central Asia since 1996. The Chinese version of the new Silk 
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Road is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A regionalist network set up by 
China to include Eurasian players such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan. The other key regional players, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Iran 
and some other seemingly random geographically separated small Asian states such as 
Cambodia are observers or guest members, without the full rights and responsibilities of 
the main former CIS nations plus China.
110 
The Chinese view the SCO as their own 
 
personal spin on regional relations. 
 
 
 
China [views the SCO] as an institutionalized means for . . . 
engagement in Central Asian affairs, as well as a platform 
for overall cooperation between China and Central Asian 
states…. In fact, the organization also benefits Russia and 
the states of Central Asia. The SCO enhances regime 
security in each country by helping to legitimize rulers. 
Since virtually none of the political leaders were selected 
through free and fair elections, the SCO functions as an 
autocrats’ club, providing rulers with a tangible means to 
demonstrate their status and offer real economic benefits to 
their citizens through international trade and investment. 
Moreover, the SCO is a forum for all the member states to 
cooperate in keeping one another in power: As secular 
authoritarian regimes, they all share a common interest in 
blocking Islamic fundamentalism and democratization.
111
 
 
This is a perplexing example of regionalism. It is not the free western ideal of 
regionalism that has been encouraged by this paper, and the west at large. It is more of a 
feudal regionalism that is, using regionalism to tie together the oppressive security 
apparatus of the original member states in order to solidify their power and political 
control. China, of course, is an autocracy, and it seeks to prevent democracy in order to 
foster its own capitalist ambitions under the misleading ethos of communism. That is, 
China is communist in its planning and state apparatus, but as capitalist as can be in the 
growth of wealth both personally and of the state. The SCO is effective in aiming to 
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curb militant Islam in the original member states but has had literally no recorded 
positive effects in the “observer” states, such as Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In fact, these 
states are denied the rights to be actual members and are castigated into what they are 
classified as by Chinese and Russian international affairs, second class states who need 
to be isolated politically. 
Economically, China and the SCO are willing to engage in limited multilateral 
investment but with caveats. Although stability is a goal, this is not the ideal form of 
regionalism for Afghanistan and Central Asia and will not provide stability across the 
region for 3 reasons. 1) The organization has existed for almost two decades, during the 
most violent modern times in Afghanistan and Central Asia and has done nothing to 
prevent or control this violence and war. 2) The key members of the region who can 
control or incite stability or instability, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and India are not 
even granted membership, but mere observer status making them less than equals. 3) 
The goals of the SCO are merely to be a polar opposite to US policy in Central Asia in 
order to strengthen alternative (Chinese and Russian) political ambitions, under the guise 
of engagement. This simply is not working and cannot work in the current power 
vacuum. 
Lessons can be learned though, and the framework can be used as a model for a 
foundation to a modern regional project. In fact, with modernizations and lack of direct 
Chinese control, this model has much promise. The structural functionalism is there, the 
underlying theory behind the project though is not the multipolar conservatism which is 
sought, but rather unipolar power projection and token investment. The primary reason 
that a Chinese security community can never properly function to its full extent is this, 
China is not willing to commit to any military or policing action overseas, and in 
Central Asia in particular. 
 
In 2008, the Chinese foreign minister said; 
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China’s position on the issue of Afghanistan has not 
changed a bit. Except for the UN peacekeeping missions 
approved by the UN Security Council, China never sends a 
single troop abroad. It’s out of the question to send Chinese 
troops  to  the  International  Security  Assistance  Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan.
112
 
 
Without this desire to engage in affirmative security or to aid in regional 
security, training and support, the SCO lacks any ‘teeth.’ Without a will or means to 
assist with security or defense the organization is even weaker than ASEAN, which 
engages in regular military exercises and cooperative actions to re-enforce regional 
relations. Lacking this security aspect makes a security community inherently weak. 
However, the belt and road initiative does give the SCO more pull through the use of 
acceptable soft power
113
. 
 
Of Course, it has been said by some analysts that they see a trend of China 
cooperating closely with Pakistan to counter US cooperation with India. This would still 
be a net gain for the region as there would be more Sino-central Asian cooperation, 
however, cooperation with all regional powers would be ideal. 
That said, increased Chinese investment in Pakistan would lead to better 
economics and possibly stability, which has the potential to wash over the border into 
Afghanistan and create larger waves of success. A rail and pipeline to the Pakistani 
coast would be fantastic, and such has been discussed between the powers. This would 
open up newer markets and would make transit of goods much easier. If Afghanistan 
would cooperate they would have access to the seas and would thus have a much more 
open means of import/export going forward. Strategically cooperation around the 
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Pakistani coast also opens up the possibility of future security dialogue and military 
attachments, all positive things for regional security.
114
 
 
 
 
3.5 Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
 
What about Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan? 
 
These states stand as pillars for the future of the region, being strong, fairly stable states 
 
run by regional ‘strong men’115. In fact, this notion of the strong man may be a 
 
possibility for future stabilization of Afghanistan itself. If the model of the autocratic 
 
former CIS states was exported to Afghanistan the larger power supported and funded 
 
strong man has a chance at bringing stability back to Afghanistan and the region, much 
 
as the Russian backed premier did until the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. With 
 
stronger support and backing a regional strong man does have the ability to hold 
 
territory, however, with this possibility also comes the inevitable human rights 
 
violations, open violence against opposition, control, and a security state. Are these 
 
qualities which Central Asia needs
116
? Or are democracy and political openness what 
 
are needed? This research is still uncertain, as there exist a vast wealth of sources 
 
pointing toward illiberal regionalism (or strong man patronialism) as a fulcrum for 
stability
117
. 
Each method of governance has its own pros and cons. The ASEAN method of 
regionalism allows the member states to decide on their own domestic policies whilst 
still engaging in regional cooperation. Can the two work hand in hand? Evidence tends 
to show a trend that yes, this can happen, however is it the ideal solution? Of that I am 
uncertain. Each nation is different, and even though democracy may work in one place 
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it may work poorly in another, and may allow violent forces to exploit this weakness in 
order to bid their own will. 
Although nation-state borders may politically divide these nations, they have an 
ethnic and cultural mega state already in the region, which borders do not respect.
118 
As 
such, these other Central Asian states have a lot they can offer Afghanistan, and the 
region at large. By being strong nations themselves, they shore up the security; they can 
grow their economies and create a larger trade community. With the raw resources these 
former CIS states have, and the established manufacturing and civic organizations, 
lessons could be taught and exported to Afghanistan and other regional states in order to 
deepen cooperation and aid. All of these states want to counter terrorism and narcotics 
as both destabilize the leadership. Cooperation on this grassroots issue is paramount, 
which can lead to further cooperation in economics, trade, education, and security.
119
 
3.6 Russia 
 
Despite  the  more  recent  entry  of  China  and  the  USA, 
Russia remains the most significant external actor with the 
most durable relationships in the political, economic, 
security and cultural spheres in [Central Asia]. It sees the 
region as it’s ‘near abroad’, part of the strategic frontiers 
with  an  unstable  Afghanistan,  and  security  engagement 
with the [Central Asia Regional Security Community] as a 
necessary step towards preventing the spread of terrorism 
and narcotics given the long borders and the migratory 
flow.…Russia therefore exerts influence bilaterally as well 
as through collective security instruments that it sponsors, 
notably the CIS and CSTO, but also to an extent the 
SCO…but its own budgetary vulnerabilities means that it 
prefers to pursue commercial and political goals without 
large financial expenditures, leaving the West to provide 
aid and assistance, including for security transfers.
120
 
 
As becomes readily clear from the above, Russia is interested in Central Asia for 
3 main reasons. 1) Russia sees Central Asia as its historic sphere of influence and is 
interested in keeping it exclusively Russian dominated through a variety of economic 
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and security programs, all of which are fitfully weak and of little use. 2) Russia seeks to 
stem the flow of militant Islamism and narcotics from the region, which is a positive as 
this is a baseline common cause that all regional powers seek and can collaborate on 
with relative ease. 3) Russia seeks to balance China’s influence in Central Asia121. 
 
What is positive from this list of disingenuous interests in the region is that 
Russia does still see itself as a major player and wants to be involved in whatever way it 
can, even if to counter American power in the region, even when the US is winding 
down its direct intervention in the region
122
. There is a positive which can be harnessed 
from this spike in interest and that is that a Russia keen on engagement and security, 
especially in the wake of the October, 2016 Metrojet terrorist attack and entrenched 
intervention in Syria, can be directly involved in guiding the region towards stronger 
security, stronger economics, and stronger cooperation, but only if it wants to. Russia 
can be a major divisive force or a force for good; it can encourage and foster relations 
between the regional powers and can provide a big power balance to American and 
Chinese support, allowing Central Asian states to conduct their own regional affairs 
under a watchful and supportive guise. As seen in Syria, Russia can also act to prop up 
a strong man regime, if it fits with Russian strategic objectives
123
. 
 
Russia participates in some concert with the region under the banner of the SCO 
and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). As a member of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization along with China, Russia seeks to counterbalance American 
affairs in Central Asia. Under this broad spectrum they are involved in regional matters, 
much like the Chinese, and can influence and contribute to regional affairs. Tajikistan, 
Russia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are part of an “anti-narcotics quartet” within the 
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organization, which is a good foundation for future cooperation between those states on 
narco-crime, as well as other matters. If this grouping could be expanded to include all 
members acting in unison against narcotics proliferation the region would be much 
better served. Russia is worried of “the danger of the restoration of a regime on Afghan 
territory that would foster the spread of terrorism, drug trafficking and instability,”124 
and this fear fits well with this papers research questions and hypothesis. That is, if 
these issues of concern can be worked upon in a constructive, meaningful manner with a 
laid out plan and concerted multilateral efforts, a new wave of Central Asian regionalism, 
be it a security community, or political debate floor, can aid in a new century of Central 
Asian affairs. As the SCO is Chinese run, Russia runs a parallel organization called the 
CSTO which is composed mainly of former CIS states. This organization is less 
regionally accepted and offers less than the SCO, however, Russia maintains 
membership in both in order to push its own agenda and undermine the US and other 
foreign powers. 
 
The pure fact that Russia is concerned and interested for their own self-interest 
fits with realist theory that this will cause them to interact in the power vacuum to seek 
norms and to protect their own security and economics, the side effect of this 
participation being a new realm of international affairs for the region. Russia is very 
aware that the regime in Kabul lacks the strength that it should have at this point, and is 
keenly aware that after the US forces leave Afghanistan there will be a major potential 
for a Taliban resurgence, which may result in another Jihadist state on Russia’s back 
door, directly risking the safety of Russian nationals, business and borders. Russia is 
interested in finding a way to counter the militant Islamist threat, whilst maintaining the 
stability of Afghanistan and growing this greater Central Asian stability for its own 
security concerns. Russia is trying to find a balance for regional security concerns. 
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Russia has little interest in allowing the SCO or the CSTO provide full 
stabilization and post conflict reconstruction efforts, as it does not wish to commit itself 
directly to a war in Afghanistan due to Russia’s own past history.125 What Russia 
currently wants to do is seek a better way to penetrate the region in order to ensure its 
own interests and security are taken care of, and whilst strengthening its own borders, 
realizes that security must start in Central Asia if it is to stem the spread of militant 
Islamism beyond the region. Moscow must deal with a broad range of regional affairs 
themselves whilst seeking the aid of regional powers such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
which are weary of Russia.
126
 
 
The sensible solution would be to have Russia support and frame a new regional 
community in order to have the region better self-police, and self-aid itself. At the very 
least Russia could stand up and back up regional strong men who seek to keep security 
and stability with economic development an immediate goal
127
. This way Russia could 
fund projects and pass on technical expertise to ensure its own needs were being met at 
the same time it makes better friends of regional powers and builds trust, consent and 
multilateral relations, to benefit all involved. Through the current security mechanisms 
of the CSTO and the SCO, Russia has a hand in Central Asian affairs. Does this hand go 
far enough to ensure their own security, and to ensure the future of the region? 
Unfortunately, the answer is no. If it did, the region would already be a stable and 
fruitful geopolitical area, but thanks to the poor cooperation links, even with the CSTO 
and SCO, the region is as divided as ever on a broad range of topics ranging from 
security to economics.
128
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The CSTO is the organization in which Russia holds the most weight. It was 
formed in 1992 and reformed in 2002. The organization is a collective security 
agreement, similar in theory to NATO or the Warsaw pact, but not nearly as well 
integrated or controlled. The organization is in essence a collection of former Soviet 
states and has become a CIS and Central Asia dominated security arrangement, as 
Afghanistan is now an observer. 
 
The major flaw of the organization is that it overlooks many concerns and does 
not include all CIS states or Central Asian states. It is a hodge-podge of membership, 
and is poorly aligned to react to or produce stability in a volatile and changing region. 
The organization is also at loggerheads with the SCO, which Russia and Afghanistan 
are also both a part to, as they appear to recreate one another and have overlapping 
domains. 
 
The CSTO is primarily a security agreement though, whilst the CSO is a political 
forum. Neither is cohesive with each other, and neither have teeth or the will and ability 
to react to any situation which may arise. This is seen through the lack of current 
cohesive and unified action in Central Asia. The small steps are there, and this is good, 
however, the bigger leaps remain to be achieved, and this is what must be done going 
forward. Rather than spread efforts around over a large canvas, it would be better for 
Russia and Central Asia, if Russia would concentrate its efforts, money, and organization 
on one unified regional organization to address the issues which directly and indirectly 
threaten and effect Central Asia, Russia, and the world. 
 
Russia has tried to create a rapid reaction force, similar to the EU rapid reaction 
force model; however, it has met much criticism from other Central Asian powers, as it 
seemed to only benefit Russian security in the region. Lessons learned from this 
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experience could prove useful in a future organization to strike an acceptable middle 
ground for any policing forces.
129
 
 
Regional organizations can be a tool for big powers to project influence. An 
indirectly supported method of this, without ideological backing is exactly what is 
needed, as it would form a strong dichotomy, allowing the regional states to develop 
their own norms and behaviors whilst under the support and general framework of larger, 
more experienced powers for collective good. Russia has been actively engaged in 
Central Asian relations for many years, and this experience is invaluable. It can be 
harnessed along with Russian industrial and security might and know-how to benefit the 
region as soon as such efforts can be organized and put into use. It is this organization 
on a mass scale, which is missing currently. However, since 2015 Russia and China 
have been cooperating closer together as Moscow joined the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (Chinese run) and supports the belt and road initiative as both support 
Russia’s own goals of influence and stability in the region130. The status quo is that 
Russia tolerates China in Central Asia, and seeks to balance its own power there with 
counter narcotics, terrorism, political influence, anti US movements and economic 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Regional Organizations of Central Asia 
 
The Central Asia region has been the Petri Dish of regional organizations since 
the end of the Russian war in Afghanistan. A multitude of different powers, both global 
and regional, have tested their ability to start, maintain and influence regional 
organizations in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Lack of dedication, lack of resources, 
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acceptance by the wider international community and unique economic and 
geographical challenges have been the downfall of many, whilst some show some 
markers of success, though far less integration has been achieved than that sought by 
this research, mainly due to a bias for large power politics vs true regional community 
building
131
. The metric for measuring the success of regional organizations, past, 
present and proposed should include acceptability to the international community, 
credibility, progress achieved, and ability to implement policy, as well as strategic and 
tactical dialogue creation. The dialogue being one of the most important yet under 
looked and under rated aspects of regional integration. This dialogue is the grassroots to 
any further cooperation and integration. The diplomatic ramifications of interaction 
between state powers are the origins of policy between states in a closer manner than 
normal geopolitical posturing. With this roadmap to future cooperation, the opportunities 
of regionalism really become ascertainable
132
. 
 
Central Asia is ripe for regional cooperation due to 4 categories defined by 
Laruelle and Peyrouse
133 
as urgent transborder issues which necessitate cooperation to 
solve; water, energy, transport and terrorism. Central Asia is already cooperating at the 
lowest levels, such as with the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline for 
energy
134
. Building upon these lowest levels of interaction are what looks most 
promising for the region. 
As such, it is theorized that regionalism is a positive thing for Central Asia, and 
that certain conditions exist between the states, such as mutual need and desire to work 
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together to find mutual solutions to common issues, which make the prospect of 
regional cooperation mutually beneficial
135
. 
 
It now benefits the research to examine one by one, the incarnations of regional 
organizations that have existed in Central Asia. Firstly, let us look at the most 
promising. Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), founded in 1997. 
This organization is composed of 11 states (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and is 
supported by 6 multilateral institutions. The organization is aspirational and may have a 
chance to evolve into a acceptable regional player. It focuses on economics, transport, 
and energy, which are good non-judgmental policies, following the ASEAN model of 
non-interference and non-judgment
136
. The mission statement is “Good neighbors, Good 
 
Partners and Good Prospects”. This regional organization has not been harnessed or 
embraced deep enough to date and it is remotely based in the Philippines; however, with 
improvements it provides a solid foundation for institution
137
.  Historically, the first 
real success of a regional organization in Central Asia was the International Fund for 
Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). This regional organization spearheaded the grassroots 
cooperation necessary for a successful regional integration. Water boundaries, 
investments and projects are all a part of the issues discussed by members in an 
organized, structured forum. The ecosystem protection between all member states is a 
relatively accepted success
138
. Although the body is limited in its realm, it demonstrates 
that regional organizations can be a success in Central Asia
139
. Another successful 
regional organization based on limited goals is the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone (CANWFZ), this limited scope treaty was agreed to by all Central Asian states 
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and guarantees the region will not seek proliferation of Nuclear weapons
140
. Although it 
is a large accomplishment, it should also be noted that some states in Central Asia 
create income from the international community by dismantling former Soviet Nuclear 
bases. Even though selfish state interest are the backer of cooperation, the states without 
Soviet nuclear facilities, still consented to the accord, demonstrating a spirit of 
cooperation for mutual goals and benefits
141
. 
 
Of the large regional organizations in Central Asia, one that is heavily organized, time 
tested, and well structured, though, critically lacking membership of Afghanistan is the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The CIS was formed in 1991 after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The organization is very much a Russian dominated 
organization, but unites its members based on the common soviet market, cultural, 
military and industrial experience. The organization has a number of organs that have 
clearly defined areas of expertise and remit. The main sources of power are the Council 
of Heads of Government and Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These two 
departments account for the bulk of the state-to-state power politicking. There are 
subordinate councils, which conduct affairs on a lower scale, and it can be said that 
these lower councils actually accomplish the most by creating trade organizations, 
border and customs unions and dealing with regional issues. The most appealing part of 
the CIS is that in the Industrial Councils, members vote on industrial policies. If 
approved, they are adopted, and with interest, if a state does not approve of it, they 
simply do not have to participate in that provision. This flexibility allows each state to 
maintain their sovereignty over certain issues and an analysis of this indicates that this 
makes this type of regional cooperation more acceptable to a broader group of states 
with varying interests and national goals, allowing differences whilst encouraging 
cooperation and not propagating isolation. There is a rotating presidency and the seat of 
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the organization is in Minsk
142
. The weakest link in the organization is that most states 
play a passive role, and even Russia favors unilateral and bilateral action vs 
multilateralism through its current foreign policy
143
. 
 
One of the larger organizations is the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). This organization has included a multitude of regional states, whilst of course, 
excluding Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The membership seems to have been very 
unorganized and chaotic with members from Europe and Central Asia, some members 
joining and leaving, and other states such as Turkmenistan never joining
144
. Regional 
powers like Uzbekistan joined and left, leaving the organization fairly weak and not 
useful. The crux of the matter was that the community was an instrument of Russian 
foreign policy, and members viewed their participation as being a tool in which to 
express their satisfaction with Russian policy affecting their nation. If Russia were not 
friendly with a state, that state would just leave
145
. This left the organization in poor 
shape and with no legitimacy. In theory, and on paper, the CSTO is logical. It consists 
of member states committed to fighting regional security matters. The treaty provides 
for military assistance on a collective basis should a member come under attack, 
provides for anti terrorism
146 
and trans border anti-criminality measures and in order to 
be more acceptable, does not allow involvement with domestic military affairs
147
. The 
 
organization does actually hold joint state run exercises like “Air Bridge 2018” and 
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“Cooperation 2018”148, but these are merely a show of force as the organization has 
never intervened in another’s territory. 
 
A relatively unknown regional organization is the Eurasian Economic 
Community
149
. This is an initiative between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Uzbekistan are not members, nor has Afghanistan ever been 
invited to membership or observer status
150
. This community is based upon the 
European Union 
151
, though has nothing like the buy in, nor benefits that the EU offers 
 
member states. The aims of the organization are to become an economic arena, 
encouraging free trade, and a common market, creating a single currency and labor 
market, in which human capital can freely move from one state to the other, much like 
the EU
152
. The organization is highly organized, and has headquarters in both Almaty 
and Moscow, demonstrating its seats of power and political backing, more than being 
convenient for all members. There is an industrial committee, a financial committee and 
a number of interesting projects to aid the block, like the Eurasian Development 
bank
153
, which finances regional development under heavy Russian funding. The major 
flaw, however, is that it is not all encompassing in membership, excludes regional states 
of utmost importance to stability and security, such as Afghanistan, and it is 
overwhelmingly Russian influenced, controlled, financed, and yet another tool of 
 
Moscow’s power projection into Central Asia and the former USSR. The integration in 
 
economics between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus lead to the Eurasian Economic 
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Union in 2015, signifying greater economic integration, but only of those three states, 
 
showing a lack of acceptance in Central Asia
154
. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Chinese 
 
backed organization, is on its metrics the most accomplished and inclusive regional 
 
body in existence in Central Asia today. Although the body is on its face a Chinese 
 
organization pushing Chinese regional goals
155
, it does go one step further than any 
 
Russian effort and actually engages with nations in Central Asia, with which China 
 
seeks cooperation. Although the origins of the SCO arose out of necessity in settling 
 
border disputes with former Soviet republics
156
, the organization has evolved to include 
 
Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey, although these Muslim states only have 
 
“observer” status, which belittles their sovereignty and makes clear that China does not 
 
see them as equals to bargain with. This very label can be said to diminish any true 
 
progress made in the organization, as mere observers of their own fate. The structure of 
 
the organization is very formal, and there is a secretariat based in Beijing and an 
 
antiterrorism body based in Tashkent. The real underlying issue with the SCO is that is 
 
it a body floundering to find it’s identity. It is a Chinese sponsored body reaching out to 
 
regional partners like the UN. It is a tool of Chinese policy to counter US influence in 
 
Central Asia, but as its agenda is rather loose, some academics have even proposed a 
 
potential tie up with the US, in order to pool resources
157
. However, as the organization 
 
is generally opposed to western influence, that seems unlikely. The truth is that the SCO 
 
has left many promises unfulfilled. There is the foundation for success, but due to 
 
Chinese dominance, a distant secretariat and loose organizational goals, measurable 
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progress has been hard to come by It is concluded that if the Central Asian states were 
 
true partners and equals in the project then there would be more buy in, more desire to 
 
participate and more lateral transfer of knowledge and abilities from one member state 
 
to the other. This equality and impetus for participation with structure is what the SCO 
 
misses. The SCO touts many generic and watered down goals like “regional peace and 
 
harmony”, however, these remain quantified158. Aside from supporting the belt and 
 
road initiative of the Silk Road belt, the program really shows no unified progress aside 
 
from furthering Chinese goals and improving some infrastructure to meet those aims
159
. 
 
Although the SCO does build on generic regionalism by furthering macro interactions 
 
between nation states, its end goals are too generic and Chinese focused to be a model 
this research backs
160
. 
 
On the opposite spectrum, the counterbalance to Russian influence, NATO set up 
their own attempt at regionalism in the early 1990’s through the “partnership for 
Peace
161” (PfP) program. This program encompassed outreach to former Soviet states in 
an effort to spread western norms and cooperation and planning on multiple levels of 
government. This program has been a success in Europe and the med, but in Central Asia 
only Kazakhstan stands out as the shining example of interoperability, when their forces 
deployed with NATO to Iraq jointly in 2003-2008
162
. This type of joint force, 
and the cooperation it represents on a variety of strata is very impressive and 
demonstrates good statesmanship and unified goals. If this type of cooperation could be 
expanded to include other Central Asian states and Afghanistan then security 
cooperation would be taken care of by this security community, but common values 
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would arise through the cooperation. However, the polarizing power of NATO
163 
and its 
image in the region is a negative, and thus reinforces the non-judgmental ASEAN
164 
style 
political discourse backed by this research. 
 
On the supranational level, both the European Union and the United Nations have 
multiple efforts in Central Asia
165
, of outstanding mention are the Border Management 
in Central Asia
166
, and the Central Asia Drug Action program
167
. Both programs are 
fairly mature and both offer funding and equipping, training and sharing of information 
between the EU, UN and Central Asian states
168
. The program is limited in its scope 
though and is but a technical skills building program which could be absorbed and 
‘owned’ by a new Central Asian body169 in order to be administered from the local 
level, in order to take advantage of foreign funds as utilizing established pathways to 
non political funding is key to creating synergy in and amongst the members of Central 
Asia
170
. These projects can actually do good to grow national bonds as long as they are 
apolitical and follow no judgment protocol, in such circumstances even a strongman 
government could cooperate with such international string less aid
171
. 
 
As Central Asia is religiously Islamic, there have also been efforts by religious 
 
organizations to participate in regional relations. The Organization of Islamic 
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Cooperation (OIC), formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference, comprised of 
 
57 states, including Afghanistan, the conference has many organs and bodies, and is run 
by heads of state of Islamic nations. The program pushes group Islamic decisions and 
although it is meant to be able to stop conflict, it has been unable to do so in Central 
Asia and thus can only be seen as a values guide for Islamic states. 
 
As the leading power in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has also put forward its own regional 
model
172
, known as The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures 
in Asia (CICA)
173
. The organization has its origins in the UN General Assembly of 
1992, and is codified in the Almaty Act of 2002. The organization’s strengths are that it 
is non judgmental, does not interfere in domestic policy, which is important for 
acceptance in Central Asia, and all decisions are by consent. It does require member 
states to affirm their commitment to the UN charter though. This organization is now 
allied with the SCO. Its mission statement is in keeping with the general theme of the 
non judgmental organization, showing an acquiescence to the non judgmental nature 
needed in Central Asia. 
 
“We have come together to advance a fundamental truth in todays world: mutual trust 
and confidence building are cornerstones of peace and security.
174” 
 
What is clear from the research is that although there are many organizations 
operating in parallel in Central Asia, none have gone far enough to attempt to unify the 
region under common goals or common security. Mutual trust and confidence building 
are the two things most needed in order to come together and redevelop the security and 
economic landscape across greater Central Asia. Assessing the actual value added by 
each of the organizations discussed above becomes problematic, as the only real metric 
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is economic development and security, both of which are severely lacking in the region. 
In terms of soft power, there has been a great deal of political successes, even if the 
stated goals of the organizations involved have not been achieved, such as the SCO
175
. 
Organizations such as this have formed many bonds politically but have not solved the 
actual real issues that confront them
176
. However, the progress of getting states talking 
and getting them together, no matter how in extensive is important as it proves in a 
series of tests that these nations can cooperation, especially on both niche and broader 
issues such as counter drug and border security, playing to their selfish state interest
177
. 
 
Chapter 5.  Why Prior Regional Organizations Failed, A New Regional 
 
Organization and Conclusions 
 
From the research conducted it is clearly indicated that a new form of 
regionalism is needed in order to further integrate and tie together Central Asia in the 
name of mutual support and security. The status quo of Central Asian affairs is simply 
failing in securing the region in order to allow business and civic life to develop at the 
pace needed going forward. As there is no workable regional solution on the table 
currently, this research advocates the establishment of a new regional model, which can 
be directly fit to Central Asia. 
 
 
Many forms of regionalism from around the world and around the region have 
 
been examined and analyzed in this research, and in accordance with the research 
 
questions, it has been found that the most appropriate form of regionalism which should 
 
be applied to Central Asia should be somewhere between a security community and a 
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loosely integrated regional community with many similarities to ASEAN, the main 
 
similarity being soft power and non-judgmental regional relations. These types of 
 
regionalism would be seen by the member states of Central Asia as most palatable as 
 
they do not significantly interfere with domestic politics, are loose organizations which 
 
encourage and foster development and reforms but do not mandate, enforce or demand 
 
concessions as terms of membership. The independent state decision making of the 
 
ASEAN model also bodes well for all types of leadership in Central Asia as it is not an 
 
interference model, like that of the EU
178
. The power of the ASEAN model is strong, 
 
with trade, tourism, and investment flows throughout the member states, signifying 
 
great progress without compromising the national governments of the individual states 
that retain their sovereignty to choose to administer their land the way they choose
179
. 
 
The types of regional organizations currently in play or historically employed in 
Central Asia, fall under a broad umbrella consisting of Geopolitical, Geographic, 
Cultural, and economic regional organizations
180
. 
 
Hard power is not something that has been found to be welcome in Central Asia, 
both by members of the region and also by the larger powers, which view the region as 
part of their sphere of influence. Hard power is hard to accept, and is not something the 
region has traditionally responded well to. Enter soft power, or the act of encouraging 
progress and investment through mutual cooperation. This type of regionalism has been 
found to be less aggressive on its face and thus is able to be better accepted and can thus 
penetrate deeper into the member states, causing better integration and cooperation over 
time. 
 
5.1 Why has regionalism thus far failed in Central Asia 
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Regionalism has failed. In so far as the spirit of regionalism to date has not 
overcome barriers of national sovereignty, political entrenchments, fear, economic 
starvation and lack of security. Recognizing that regionalism has failed to achieve 
cohesive, substantive results which significantly improve the situation in Central Asia is 
key to understanding why it has failed. Regionalism is not dead, it is just frozen in a 
political purgatory unable and unwilling to flourish beyond a point due to numerous 
external and internal factors. 
 
In order to understand why regional organizations have not grown at the pace 
needed to overcome the regions ills it makes sense to first analyze the base level of 
governance, the state. In all Central Asian states the state plays a central role in 
everything from the media to health and welfare to economic management and 
entanglement of government with private business. This governing intervention in 
economics can be seen as good intentions acting badly. That is to say the governments 
become involved in private enterprise but are unable to innovate, grow and diversify or 
improve the business and end up strangling the free enterprise. The governments of all 
Central Asian states suffer from the undermining plague of corruption, according to 
 
Peter Evans; 
 
 
“…[there is]…the informal interaction of state with private interests. It is 
 
therefore often used as a synonym for corruption, clientelism, patronage, cronyism, 
 
nepotism, the ‘big man’ syndrome, godfather-ism, warlordism, capture, predation, 
 
kleptocracy, prebendal regime, etc….181” 
 
 
What is taken from the above is that the very fabric of the state and thus society 
 
is caught up in this cyclical system of have and have nots, there is entitlement, and 
 
pervasive institutional favoritism rampant throughout Central Asia. The true reformers 
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have issues being heard as the elites remain at the top, surrounded by their family, their 
 
‘tribe’, and their supporters. This problematic continual support and the rise of the one 
 
tier of society only causes inequity, lack of political voice and stifles change and 
 
progress. This rise of so-called ‘presidential monarchies182’, has lead to stalling of 
 
actual long term progress in terms of western democracy. However, this exposes a new 
 
paradigm in Central Asia, one which asks if western democracy is even appropriate for 
 
the region? The integration of blocs like the EU cannot happen, as strong man 
 
patronialism remains popular in the region. The ASEAN model allows this type of 
 
national rule while softly pursuing reforms, economic and technological links as well as 
 
people to people communication
183
. Perhaps, what is most appropriate is a loose 
 
regional organization following the ASEAN model which overseas progress and ground 
 
up links between states, whilst remaining impartial and encouraging rather than 
 
judgmental and imposing of top down policies, which simply are unacceptable to the 
 
people, and have not worked to date. 
 
 
Daniel Bach has called such illiberal states “anti development” states, and has 
compared states where there is little confidence in the central government, and who 
have vast recourses but an underdeveloped infrastructure and weak economy which 
mainly serves the rich to states like Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. This is 
compounded when there is large portions of international aid and much money to be 
pocketed and skimmed from the sale of hydrocarbons. What is really desired is 
economic performance and state building, but what we get is stagnation and the creation 
 
of a ‘low equilibrium’184. However, to counter this, we need only look to look at the 
 
public infrastructure and national development in the authoritiarian states of China, 
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Kazahstan and Turkmenistan for example to disprove this myth that strong national 
 
governments lead to weak living conditions, rather, they can spur development and 
 
promote norms of conflict management and promote alternate norms as these non 
 
liberal actors seek sustained hegemonic control through social discourse, space, and the 
 
economy, and create a hybrid localization of global practices. This new notion of 
 
‘illiberal peace’ has proven effective in many states in the region, as the hegemons deny 
 
usage of all spatial dimensions to militants and opponents and thus uphold stability with 
 
force. Although this third option may seem peculiar, it is growing in acceptance and is 
 
actively promoted by the SCO
185 
as a harbinger for a future non-western world order. 
 
By controlling all vectors of society and through injections of national wealth and 
 
power this authoritarian conflict management can control the battle space and bring 
 
peace. It is also not at odds with an ASEAN style of regional model, which tolerates this 
 
control, while developing grass roots integration, especially as local actors may reject 
 
international (western) policies and see a new strategy as promising
186
. Authoritarian 
 
conflict management is defined as “ The prevention, de-escalation or termination of 
 
organized armed rebellion or other mass social violence through methods that rely on 
 
instruments of state coercion and hierarchical structures of power to re-establish 
 
political order and stability, and eschew liberal practices of negotiated settlement, third- 
 
party mediation, and constraints on the use of force’187. Thus, this type of conflict 
 
management may bode well for a future central Asia, and this new reality needs to be 
 
worked with and regional links developed alongside, as this type of conflict 
 
management meets the immediate goals of violence reduction, terrorism reduction, 
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stability and opens the space for economic and social development alone or with a non 
 
judgmental regional organization. 
 
 
The pure abundance of natural resources of Central Asia can also been seen as a 
 
bipolar resource. On one hand the abundance of fresh water, hydroelectric power, 
 
agricultural products such as Cotton and Hydrocarbons make the region both potentially 
 
very wealthy, but also very afraid to share the wealth. It has been widely speculated that 
 
Central Asia does not need regionalism as it has the ability to be self-wealthy without 
 
sharing or pooling of recourses
188
. However, it has widely been speculated that the 
 
water, electricity, and oil and gas from other Central Asian states could jump start the 
 
Afghanistan economy. This is where the regionalism comes into full swing, as there 
 
would need to be roads built, pipelines, better business and trade links, more air travel, 
 
more hotels, better communications connectedness, upgraded finance, and commercial 
 
transactions and thus job creation, and wealth creation. A regional institution modeled 
 
after ASEAN, could aid in governmental links, regulations, customs and excise and 
 
guarantee safe and efficient transport through better policing, roads, and combating 
 
militant factions which seek to undermine this progress, thus uniting the region on a 
 
scale never seen before. 
 
 
Another potentially large reason why regionalism thus far has not fully adapted 
 
to Central Asia or Central Asia has not fully embraced regionalism is due to the concept 
 
know as neopatrimonialism. 
 
 
“Neopatrimonialism supposes centralized and hierarchical corruption that 
 
operates in a pyramidal fashion, and serves a political legitimacy strategy. Cronyism is 
 
also found in all societies, including legal-rational democracies, because it is based on 
 
an exchange of services between business groups and political circles, especially when 
 
 
188 
Inomjon Bobokulov, ‘Central Asia: Is There an Alternative to Regional Integration’, Central Asian 
Survey, 25/1-2, (2006). 
108 
 
it involves the allocation of public funds. Cronyism does not consistently prevent 
 
economic growth, as it can operate in systems that produce wealth, while 
 
neoparimonialism is not productive since the exchange is not fair. The latter therefore 
 
does not allow wealth to flow, as market mechanisms are designed only to meet the 
 
rulers’ needs. According to the World Bank, countries with neopatrimonial systems are 
 
among those with the Largent Gini coefficient, which is indicative of the unequal 
 
distribution of wealth.
189” 
 
 
This patrimonialism which is common throughout Central Asia has its origins as 
 
a theory in Max Webers sociology of domination and legitimacy. Neopatrimonialism is 
 
defined primarily by the hybridity between the two logics of domination and legitimacy, 
 
a characteristic hybridity
190 
common to Central Asia. This neopatrimonialism in 
 
Central Asia is seen in government, through the strong man theory that lead to long 
 
term dynastic rule, which though it builds stability through the police state set up to 
 
defend the regime, challenges western norms of democracy and freedom. The 
 
neopatrimonialism defines the informal interaction of state with private business. It 
 
shows how they are awkwardly married and leads to corruption. This gives rise to the 
 
cycle of clan politics which is extremely hard to break. Even Uzbekistan which has 
 
gone through major reforms has noticed that clan politics cannot be totally liquidated 
 
and that clan politics really erodes liberty
191
. 
 
 
Some want to slowly push it from conscious group memory
192
, however, it has 
 
recently gained some traction that in the current state of the international system, liberal 
 
peace building (which has failed in Afghanistan, for instance), is being challenged and 
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replaced by norms of war and military victories, in places such as Syria, Ukraine, and 
 
Sri Lanka. This alternative concept for pax Central Asia is called Authoritarian Conflict 
 
Management (ACM), and consists of reigning control in three spheres, 1) discourse 
 
(information), 2) spatial politics (society), and 3) political economy (distribution of 
 
resources). By controlling all three the power essentially owns the battle space, and can 
 
manipulate and coax to aid the state in its goals. In Uzbekistan it has been argued that a 
 
‘good authority figure’ would be a ‘strong and ruthless but benevolent and wise paternal 
 
figure who’s influence would hold sway over neighborhood, city and state.193’ This self 
 
regulating peace is also noted in Tajikistan where locals claim ‘peace and harmony is 
 
dependent upon the existence of good male leaders…political figures’194. These 
 
hierarchical mediators and leaders are revered across central Asia including in 
 
Kazakhstan and Afghanistan as part of traditional cultural norms. This paternalistic 
 
authority is self-justifying for ruling elites, and is even seen in Turkey with President 
 
Erdogan
195
. Although, the negatives are many, the unifying factors ACM brings, may 
 
cause it enough justification to be something to consider applying to the region in 
 
concert with an ASEAN style regional organization. These ACM actors engage with 
 
NGO’s and accept their work but do not allow it to affect political systems. Likewise 
 
the SCO and CSTO both promote peace through hierarchical models, as to them 
 
liberalism is a destabilizing factor, counter to western liberalism
196
, eschewing the 
 
traditional view on regionalism in Central Asia. 
 
 
Looking at Central Asia as a whole and reflecting upon the large amount of 
 
different regional organizations that have existed some common threads emerge. 
 
Primarily, the organizations have either been sponsored by Russia or China and have 
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been limited as they mainly served to support and pursue the foreign policy of those 
 
states, and crucially did not include all members of the region and neighbors (such as 
 
Iran and Pakistan), and secondly, if the organizations were run by a single less powerful 
 
global state like Kazakhstan, the progress stalled and failed to progress even though 
 
there was promise. In order to overcome this, there must be more buy in, and deeper 
 
government and populace support at the local and international level. Although a large 
 
power pushing their own agenda is not at all needed, the political support of a large 
 
power is favorable as it brings with it legitimacy and the global stage. Lastly, the UN 
 
and EU have been very successful in their regional initiatives, although these are 
 
initiatives funded by the respective NGO and are not regionalist in the pure sense of the 
 
definition as they are not based in the region nor do they serve the long-term goals of 
 
regional members post funding. These initiatives for peace, security and borders have 
 
been wide in their scope though and the skills learned could be further built upon by 
 
regional members without the NGO influence, as common ground and need has been 
 
established. Going forward, these very successes at all levels without direct foreign 
 
influence should be followed in the new model to ensure long-term viability. There 
 
have come and gone many regional efforts previously, but it is argued they failed 
 
directly due to lack of acceptance and support from the states. The SCO has emerged as 
 
a real ‘norm entrepreneur’ recasting discourse through multilateralism. This directly 
 
contradicts NGO and US lead liberal political norms, which never really caught on in 
 
Central Asia. This failed ‘socialization’ of Central Asia is what allows it to remain 
 
chaotic. Rather than top down international orders to interconnect what was needed was 
 
a body which encourages mutual respect, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non 
 
aggression and non interference in internal affairs. Acharya has argued that international 
 
normal are not accepted or rejected through norm diffusion but rather are adapted, 
 
localized and given new meaning through ‘constitutive localization’, such as practiced 
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by ASEAN
197
. This ultimately is what has failed so far. There has been no real 
 
localized effort, no localized norms, no respect for tradition and culture, and no bottom 
 
up effort. Change is slow, and can only be encouraged, not forced. Central Asia has 
 
become a microcosm of broader world trends, and this is reflected in shifts in attitudes 
 
towards international liberal norms and global power.
198 
Hybrid norms and sovereignty 
 
norms are becoming the new standard and a new regional organization needs to take 
 
this into account when entering the arena as a neutral arbiter for good. 
 
 
5.2 How to Incubate Interstate Interconnectedness 
 
Institutionalist theory assumes that states are rational actors which are uncertain 
of each other’s interests and act in their own self-interest; this fits much with neo- 
conservatism which assumes that states are unpredictable actors which act in their own 
selfish interests. This theoretical framework makes regional integration based on 
mutual interests the best line to pursue. The rationale behind that is that if something 
benefits the states in question, the actor will cooperate to profit for themselves, even if 
such cooperation is on a quasi-supranational scale in order to achieve their own goals. 
Of course, the weakness of this logic is that the cooperation is only superficial until the 
goals are achieved, but it is projected that if the goals are numerous and for perpetuity, 
the actors will learn that interaction is a positive and that mutual benefits actually 
benefit all parties exponentially, and accomplishes state goals. This cooperation also 
reduces the volatility and unpredictability of the anarchical society power vacuum as 
 
projected by Hedley Bull. If a power vacuum exists, why not fill it with ACM and a 
 
new regional model, which can provide dual stability and development
199
. 
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According to Robert Keohane, “Institutions are necessary […] in order to 
achieve state purposes.”200 Thus regional institutions remain relevant in this new 
normative Central Asia. Although common interests may exist, regionalism and 
institutionalism require the states to adjust national policies to meet the demands and 
interests of others. This is the adjustment process, and is best achieved with the help of 
institutions. As such, according to Keohane the capacity or ability of the regional 
organization to work is the limiting factor. For real multilateral cooperation to foster 
there needs to be a solid understanding of regionalism. 
Regionalism can be defined from the grass roots to mean simple interaction 
between the states up to the total integration of a political block. This beneficial 
regionalism should be viewed as “purposive interaction, formal and informal, among 
state and non-state actors of a given area in pursuit of shared external, domestic and 
transnational goals.”201  The regionalism that this research foresees in Central Asia is 
the type which, “the process that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, 
complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographic 
space.”202  This interaction will result in development and cooperation across the 
 
spectrum, but following the ASEAN model of soft power and acceptability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Tangible Goals and Measured Successes 
 
But how do you measure the progress of regionalism? This measurement has 
been defined as “regionness”203 and is used to explain how regionally aligned and 
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integrated member states are. For Central Asia, this will start as it is today, as weak, and 
through the process of the regional forum should steadily increase as participation, 
acceptance, experience and results come from active engagement. Regionness can be 
judged by geographic proximity, transnational social relations, and formal political 
integration. According to this theory, the more factors that are present, and the higher 
the regionness score. This theory is, however, limited in that it does not go so far as to 
explain that transport, and economic links are key to this regional integration and thus 
contribute significantly to the idea of regionness, and this process can still apply even 
with the ACM advocated by this research. 
 
The notion of regionalism expanding in Central Asia had the ability to propagate 
and grow new norms, foster international norms and encourage more normalized 
relations on an interregional and international basis.
204  
The current efforts at 
regionalism failed to include all actors, both state and non-state in peace negotiations 
 
has been a large fracture point. This lack of organic Central Asian based inclusiveness 
and non-judgment has been the ultimate failure of regionalism to date. 
 
A true Cental Asian forum would reduce direct outside influence from Russia, 
China, and the US and would encourage these actors to exert pressure within the 
regional forum and thus further develop regional norms.
205
 
 
Representatives  from  all  parts  shall  assemble  at  the 
center…, the people selecting them from among those who 
are learned, wise, faithful, and have the good of the country 
at heart, and in whom the nation can fully put its trust.
206
 
- Nadir Shah 
 
Applying this very sentiment to the makings of a new regional forum would be 
 
an ideal way to garner support. Buy-in is what is needed to make the organization 
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successful, and by putting the best, brightest, and most trusted in charge of this effort on 
the national scale, really makes the entire process a lot more digestible. A major issue 
with current regional politics is that there is very little trust between the states. In order 
to build this trust, there has to be some tangible benefits for the people.
207 
For a regional 
organization to make any headway it must be accepted and tolerated by the people it 
covers. Trust and good will are key to all politics, but ever more so in the environment 
in which Central Asia finds itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Justification for the New Regional Organization and 
Proposed Structure 
 
The new regional forum is needed for a number of reasons, the main being that 
 
1) The region is incapable of stability as it currently stands, 2) There is little economic 
and social progress in the region, even with current efforts and organizations at work, 
and 3) Consolidating all efforts by into one Central Asian based body charged with 
administration of the region and its affairs would be the most efficient and effective use 
of money, people, and is in line with both theoretical stance and US policy.
208
 
 
The new regional forum shall have its base goals built upon the ASEAN model, 
as this model of acceptable, home grown norm development, is tried and tested and fits 
best to this region. If these baseline goals are followed through and distilled locally, 
then these goals will be more acceptable, more adaptable and easier to be 
accomplished.
209
 
 
A blueprint of strategic goals to be accomplished by the new Central Asian 
 
regional community are as follows: 
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• Disrupt terrorist networks 
 
• Promoting a more capable, accountable and effective government in 
Afghanistan 
 
 
• Developing self-reliant Afghan security forces 
 
• Include Pakistan in regional discource 
 
 
• Encourage dialogue between the heads of state, no matter their form of 
government. 
 
 
• Establish a regional security and economic group within the regional forum. 
 
 
• Jointly develop agriculture and energy for mutual strength and wealth. 
 
• Greater commitment to raising living standards and global visability.210 
 
 
 
The creation of a more capable regional community with soft power vs. hard power is 
the marked difference in the application of recent US policy. US policy is focused on a 
war on two fronts, politically and with actual military hardware. The regional community 
which is most easily appealable to the people and nation states of Central Asia is one 
which is not inherently aggressive, thus without military teeth and thus extremely 
different. Should a future security community become a reality at a later date, the most 
recent US policy on security in Central Asia would still be pertinent. 
This policy calls for executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military 
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. This intervention in Afghanistan is pre- 
supposed to cause ripple effects across Central Asia resulting in the stability of 
Afghanistan and thus the remainder of Central Asia. The major difference to the soft 
power approach favoured by the new regional organization is that it is top down, versus 
down to top. That is, this research believes that the best way to stabilize Afghanistan is 
to strengthen Central Asia through regionalism and thus cause the unity of the region, 
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which will sweep stability into Afghanistan. The hangover US policy and that of a 
future regional security focus group would be to; 
1)  Securing Afghanistan’s south and east against a return of Terrorists 
 
 
2)  To aid Afghan government in establishing control 
 
3)  Providing the Afghan security forces with the mentoring needed to become 
effective. 
 
 
What needs to be done is to rehabilitate captured and surrendered insurgents and 
must break the link between narcotics and the insurgency. Furthermore, the regional 
organization must assist Pakistan in capabilities to fight insurgents, as this causes 
weakness to the region and threatens all regimes. The new regional organization must 
strengthen trade relations and maximize long-term economic and policy aims. Any 
security community or regional organization must also encourage foreign investment in 
key economic sectors. Lastly, any new body must reach out to large powers and ask 
them to provide assistance to accomplish shared objectives and have sustained 
commitment, with substantial resources. 
 
As can be seen, the steps above, outside of direct combat action, can be part of 
the policy for either a regional security community or the new regional organization.
211
 
The specific goals listed are the goals of the new regional organization. With the greater 
participation element, and the shift away from combat with the Taliban, to negotiation 
and reconciliation with the Taliban, greater inclusiveness ought to bring with it better, 
more lasting results. By removing the hard power element, the acceptability factor 
increases and makes the net gains by each party greater. This accomplishment of self- 
interests fosters cooperation and mutual goals through multilateralism. 
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As this research is directly proposing a soft power based inclusive regional 
organization, policies should be implemented which increase cooperation across a broad 
spectrum of regional activities from the high priority targets of counter narcotics, 
transnational crime and counter terrorism proliferation to the mundane yet important 
aspects of the regional economy such as agricultural growth sectors and water and 
electricity production, as well as oil and gas and road, rail, air, and shipping 
infrastructure. Without an effective and safe way to move goods, there can be no real 
interregional commerce. Security is key, and should be shored up through the 
organizations allocation of funds and training of police and state security apparatus. 
 
Education and civil society are all elements of stability, and these can be 
accomplished with the support of the regional organization. The United Nations has also 
developed a plan for regional cooperation. This plan is based on the UN being the sole 
agent of regional change, and though that itself is flawed based upon the inability of the 
UN to effectively govern and keep peace in the region, due to numerous external and 
internal factors, the plan is still solid for an example of what is needed in the new 
organization. 
 
The UN has called for a 6+2 organization in order to include more Central Asian 
states, as well as cooperation with other communities focused on development like the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. The UN has also discussed setting up a civic 
affairs office to administer civil affairs. The UN noted that Afghan society was heavily 
divided and it has been stated by Barnett that a reconstruction and institute building 
package is necessary before any progress can be carried out. This would be addressed 
by the regional organization as the central administrative organ in this fiscal dispersal, 
versus the current unaccountable money machine. Barnett has also called for the 
transition from peace-making to peace building with a heavy focus on the economy. 
Transformation from a war economy to a global economy is what the regional 
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organization needs to achieve for Afghanistan and all of Central Asia, in order to make 
the region both competitive for investment and output and also to build stability via 
jobs, which in turn creates wealth, and thus a reason to care about security and domestic 
issues amongst the population. This grassroots care for the population is what the new 
organization must focus on, dealing must not side-line it exclusively with nations, and it 
must foster the people, and develop the lives of the people of the region.
212
 
 
These people want education, they want healthcare, and they want jobs. With 
their support, true development is possible. Another issue with the current state of 
affairs is that there is no budget, no Marshall-aid style package, and no concentrated 
effort. There are multiple actors acting in converse ways, in a multitude of bilateral 
relationships with no clear-cut goals. According to Peter Krasnopolsky: 
 
The magnitude of resources required to have a significant 
impact on incentives appeared to be far beyond what the 
international community had offered. The renewed 
engagement  of  the  international  community  means  that 
state building and reconstruction are not only recognised as 
desirable but may also now be backed up with significant 
political and financial resources. The security, political and 
socio-economic transitions need to occur simultaneously, 
rather than sequentially. For example, a continued political 
vacuum is likely to lead to the reinvigoration of the war 
economy and there are already signs of this happening with 
poppy planting apparently occurring in newly ‘liberated’ 
areas.
213
 
 
Learning from this analysis and the experiments in regionalism in Central Asia 
 
in the past, as well as drawing from the projects in regionalism around the world, the 
 
new regional organization can take its lead from ASEAN, and establish an organization 
 
that is truly non-judgmental and thus palatable. This organization can affect change 
 
through soft power, encouragement, and regional initiatives without judging the other 
 
member states. The organization will be fully inclusive and will grant each Central 
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Asian state and regional power equal footing. It will not be exclusive like the SCO or 
CSTO, which have side-lined the actual key actors in Central Asia in pursuance of their 
own big power agendas. The new organization will also engage with and work 
alongside non-state actors such as the Taliban, in an effort to make them integrated and 
part of the puzzle as apart to a factionalized minority who can actually significantly 
shape the political and security landscape of the entire region. 
 
Russia and China are willing to participate in any regionalism and this backing 
brings with it treasures in the form of expertise and investment. Russia sees itself able to 
interact with Central Asia much more easily, should the region stabilize, and Russia has 
indicated it is quite ready to cooperate in counter terror, economic projects and counter 
crime, all things which the regional organization will pursue to the fullest.
214 
China has 
also signalled its intentions to cooperate in Central Asian regionalism through both its 
initiatives in the SCO, which can be migrated into the new regional forum which will 
concentrate efforts, but also through its own investments and investment potential in 
Afghanistan and greater Central Asia.
215 
China, indeed, should be willing to get access 
to Turkmen energy to feeds its growing market. As this first with its Belt and Roads 
 
initiative. This access to energy can actually make Afghanistan a key transit point for 
energy and hydropower, and this is a growth market for every nation in Central Asia 
and has been identified as a large potential project by the World Bank for 
development.
216 
Developing the economy will be a major pillar of the regional 
organization as through economics, there can be denser integration into regional trade 
and communication links. Cotton, gas, minerals, and rare earth metals
217 
and cash crops 
 
are the future, as well as manufacturing for the large population of the region who is 
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developing a taste for consumerism and where the potential market capitalization is 
large. There is currently no economic planning, par say, in Central Asia; with this 
planning the economic status of the region could significantly change. 
Regardless of how this dilemma is solved, the economic 
lesson for planners in the Middle East [and Central Asia] 
must be clear by now: A frontal attack by simultaneous or 
rapidly successive investments in a number of different 
industries will remedy the deficiency in purchasing power 
(provided transport costs and other barriers to movement of 
goods  are  low  enough  to  make  economic  exchange  of 
goods between the various segments of the economy 
possible) whereas even a substantial application of capital 
in an isolated project will be discouraging if not wasted. 
Only when enough people making diverse products are 
working with higher productivity due to higher capital per 
capita can a number of projects support each other.
218
 
 
More income equals stability, and with this stability comes regional stability and 
prosperity. 
 
With the cooperation of Iran and India who both seek to penetrate the market, 
Iran has a dire need to cooperate on narcotics as Afghanistan accounts for 90% of the 
world’s opium production. Half of that product is smuggled across the Iranian border, 
and of that a large number of domestic addictions are fed. Iran has the highest opiate 
addiction rate in the world, and is keen to help Afghanistan develop saffron not opium, 
and is ready and able to help Central Asia combat drug trafficking alongside economic 
links such as road building and technological advances including in agriculture.
219  
India 
 
on the other hand is also keen to counter Islamic terror, and develop an economy in 
Central Asia. It has the ability to project and train security and expands its mega 
economy to the benefit of itself and Central Asia.
220
 
 
With the background set, and the major regional actors ready to cooperate, with 
 
the ability to influence Central Asia relations dramatically, what form shall the regional 
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body take? If the regional organization is to look, function, and work as a legitimate 
organization, it should need a seat for its delegation. The logical situation would be 
Kabul, as Afghanistan is truly at the heart of Central Asia, both in terms of geography 
and as a hub for ethnic groups and cultures. It is a real cross road, and would make a 
new ‘silk road’ possible. Having the organization based in Kabul would cause 
infrastructural development, global and regional interest in the city, and would force 
Afghanistan to own a more high profile position in regional affairs. The city would need 
security, and this would be an interest of all member states. Afghanistan has been 
described as the new “hub” of Central Asia, and is well located to serve as the head of 
this regional effort. According to the Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012, Central Asia 
has actually significantly integrated its economy, and can capitalize on a large market 
share of domestic regional products versus import products and can export billions of 
dollars’ worth of raw and manufactured materials. With the cooperation of the major 
powers, the regional organization has a good set up
221
. 
 
 
The organs of the regional organization will initially be divided into 4 pillars. The 
first will be the regional agency responsible for aid delivery and dispersal, as the large 
amount of foreign aid the region receives can be distributed in a more focused and 
targeted approach, where it is needed most. This will also increase accountability, which 
in turn will both make progress more likely, and will make other nations more willing to 
donate funds. 
 
The second agency will deal with economic issues, such as regional trade deals, 
customs tariffs (potentially a Central Asian customs union or free trade area) and 
manufacturing and industrial incentives and expertise. This agency will draw on the vast 
breadth of knowledge in the region in order to organize the economies of those who 
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wish to participate to be in unison and not in competition, allowing for a variety of 
products, which can be traded between the regions and exported. Investment and 
economic infrastructure will also be dealt with along with transport matters such as 
road, rail and aerial and seaport development. 
 
The third agency will deal exclusively with criminal policing, and will be the 
authority on regional cooperation in counter narcotics, drawing on the vast experience 
of all member states plus the US DEA, Russian Federal Police, and Chinese security 
apparatus as well as Indian and Iranian police, all experienced counter narcotics forces 
who are willing to pass on their knowledge to the region in order to meet their mutual 
goals to protect their own borders from such crime. The policing agency will also work 
towards mutual training and establishing Central Asian policing norms and the rule of 
law. 
 
The fourth pillar will be an agency whose exclusive remit is administration, this 
will be the agency where the general assembly is located where member states and 
organizations can discuss issues at hand, and resolve their problems in a constructive 
and logical manner. This general set up of the regional organization lays out the main 
elements of the organization, the elements needed to make it function and to improve 
upon regional relations. This organization would replace the multiple uncoordinated 
efforts in order to channelize attention where it is needed imperatively. 
 
The synergy produced by this consolidation is similar to that seen in business 
institutional change and reformation. The goal is to create a leaner, central, and more 
efficient and effective mechanism in order to gain control of Central Asian regionalism 
for the benefit of the region at large. With the region’s economy kick started, and 
nations working together on common goals, relations will warm, and the stability 
should in theory spread to Afghanistan where the regional organization will penetrate 
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government to influence regional norms and goals to pursue a common agenda towards 
progress without western direct involvement, something all member states of the region 
desire. 
 
The cost to fund such an organization is not something this research can clearly 
and accurately predict, but what can be said is that the total cost would be less than what 
has already been expended by all of the states involved. Also, the leaner, more efficient 
political progress would provide recurring savings over the long term, making this 
project a sound investment, both by outside nations and member states of Central Asia. 
 
The regional organization would be known as the Central Asian Forum (CAF), 
and would better the interests of the people and states of Central Asia to an extend 
unheard of today. This is the progress the region needs and has the potential to carry 
forward progress made in the past, and to build an organization, which can be as 
successful as its counterparts in Asia, Africa, South America, and Europe. This stable 
Central Asia would thus result in a stable Afghanistan. The cooperation on large issues 
will be the foundation for future progress and integration. This is in line with the 
taxonomy and the key elements for regional cooperation exposed in this research. This 
model would be tangible, acceptable, and workable and can be applied to Central Asia 
now.  The ASEAN spirit and model will be used, and the non judgmental, non invasive 
policies of ASEAN transposed to Central Asia. This will lead to acceptability and will 
foster cooperation. This regional organization can work hand in hand with ACM as 
together they offer real prospects of stability through cooperation with governments 
who can actually establish ‘sustained modes of governance that encompasses different 
phases of a conflict, including cessation of armed violence, post-conflict settlement and 
reconstruction processes, and on-going conflict prevention mechanisms’
222
. The ACM 
 
contains the domestic conflict, and the regional organization fosters growth and 
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cooperation unseen before, working hand in hand, or side by side to achieve mutual 
parallel goals
223
. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
 
“The focus of the violence emanating from this region is not confined to 
Afghanistan or Pakistan alone, but spans the entire world, especially Europe and North 
America.”224 The threat of instability that Pakistan and Afghanistan pose to Central 
Asia, and indeed the world is great. As such, there has been a great deal of interest in 
the stabilization and security of these two nations, with plans, conferences, and security 
agreements all attempting to address the security situation in Central Asia for the sake of 
regional and global stability. The United States, China, Russia, and the United Nations 
have all attempted to introduce a draft plan or policy towards greater regional 
cooperation. The Chinese and Russians have formed and adapted regional security 
communities and cooperation organizations to tackle the unique problems posed by 
Central Asia; however, none of these organizations have produced a workable Central 
Asian based organic model for regional cooperation. There has been a great deal of 
bilateral efforts to improve the security and economic conditions in Central Asia, 
however, all have fallen short of the mark. That is to say the research has indicated that 
there exists a gap in the current regional situation regarding total inclusiveness in order 
to create a workable regional solution to the conflict and instability in Central Asia. The 
literature indicates that many in Central Asia see the instability of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan as the biggest security threat to the region, and as such the region, 
themselves must act in concert to address the deficiencies in security, economics, and 
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social matters in these nations.
225    
There needs to a mechanism to address the issues in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia, and it needs to be locally originated.
226  
The research 
questions have been answered and the logical nexus is that a new wave of regionalism 
in Central Asia is needed in order to ‘own’ the situation in Central Asia. A large number 
of key issues which necessitate regional cooperation have been identified, and if these 
baseline issues are dealt with multilateralism originating from within Central Asia itself, 
the stability of Central Asia and thus Afghanistan can be secured. Regional matters such 
as transitional crime, people trafficking, counter narcotics, and counter terrorism require 
immediate attention. The member states of Central Asia and their large power backers 
have shown great interest and initiative in fostering regional relations, however, none 
have managed to change the status quo. To date, Central Asia remains highly divided and 
a tinderbox of criminality and terrorism. This research has found that the people of 
Central Asia need to be more included in any governmental initiatives, going forward, 
as well as state and non-state actors. 
 
 
 
The logic of pursuing a regional approach in Afghanistan in 
flawless in theory. However, what is required to truly 
achieve a regional solution Afghanistan’s neighbours- both 
those that border it and those who influence its stability, 
must collaborate to advance the goals of economic 
prosperity, harmony and political integration, neighbourly 
peace    and    stabilization    through    counter    terrorism, 
economic policy, and state building programs.
227
 
 
Through governmental programs focusing on making the government more 
strong, credible, and transparent, confidence can increase. A regional organization 
which can foster these social goals is highly desirable and can significantly contribute to 
regional stability. The skills and expertise in the region are varied and when used in 
concert can have a very deep effect on the stability of Central Asia, by better 
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combatting regional issues to produce a world class model of stability and post conflict 
migration from war zone to economic zone. 
It has been stated that the insurgent’s goal in Afghanistan is to wait, to win by 
waiting for the International community as a whole to lose interest in Afghanistan and 
Central Asia, and to then rise up again and seize control.
228 
It has been demonstrated in 
this research that if security and economic growth are established the two will be self- 
fulfilling and will continually grow the other, this in turn, will create a more fertile 
environment for peace, prosperity and development. By engaging the region and all of 
the actors, including, the Taliban, something which has never been done before on a 
mass regional scale, there can be tangible progress. Many forms of regionalism have 
been examined and the security community or soft power community have proven to be 
the most likely to work for a regional model. The security community is more a long- 
term goal, whilst the non-judgmental, loose regionalism followed by ASEAN has been 
found to be the most appropriate means of regionalism to apply to Central Asia. What is 
meant is that non-judgmental engagement is easy to accept, it allows the nation state to 
slowly change, by introducing regional norms, encouraging development, and fostering 
stability, security and economic growth. 
 
The idea of a Central Asian based organic, regional organization is 
revolutionary. It simply has not been conceived before and is one, which must be 
pursued if the needs of the region are to be adequately and properly addressed. Of 
course, many instances exist which may not allow the direct application of such a 
regional model, however, the current strategy in Central Asia is not working and should 
be abandoned in favour of a more consolidated, single track approach, which combined 
multilateral diplomacy with stimulus packages, aid, and investment. A central body 
which can administer and serve as the nexus of regional issues is a must, and can 
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revolutionize regional affairs in Central Asia, leading to stability throughout the region, 
and thus in Afghanistan. Central Asia needs to have its own regional solution, but this 
will require the acquiescence of regional and global powers. As without cohesive and 
unified support, the long term credibility and funding of any regional body are 
limited.
229
 
 
 
This research has proven that the new wave of regionalism for Central Asia 
 
controlled by a Central Asian regional organization fit the strategic long term goals of 
 
the United States, Russia, China, and even Iran and India. This strategic alignment, 
 
alongside the potential net ‘wins’ each state in the region and global powers can gain 
 
from regional cooperation indicate that the net result from this type of new regional 
 
cooperation and collaboration are positive for all involved. The region as a whole can 
 
do more to encourage trade links, build transport links and develop industries for mutual 
 
profit.
230 
Encouraging investment and effectively managing and promoting such 
 
investment whilst legitimately governing allocation and use of donations and resources 
 
would make the region a much more attractive place for investors, donors and would do 
 
much to change the political and economic landscape to further the goals of the regional 
 
and global powers. There must be ownership of conflict, and remedial action by the 
 
Central Asian states. ACM adequately addresses conflict abatement and management 
 
and is a realistic neo-norm developing in Central Asia which allows stabilizaiton on the 
 
national level, so that regional cooperation can take place. Transition theory is flawed, 
 
whilst illiberal authoritarianism has been proven to be an effective tool in stabilizing 
 
and fostering economic and social growth. With neopatrimonialism there is a patron – 
 
client relationship, business networking and a real impetus to cooperate and work 
 
alongside the ruling government. Business is the new ideology. There is trickle down 
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and a middle class flourishing under these regimes. In some of the patrimonial states 
 
like Tajikistan, there is even pockets of tolerated liberalism, proving that there can be 
 
economic and security progress with measured and controlled norms. It has been 
 
theorized that this ACM really just contains a fragile peace, however, there is a peace 
 
and this is the real goal. The SCO and other non western powers are distilling these new 
 
norms in Central Asia, and the paradigm is being crossed estabilishing these regimes as 
 
acceptable. International Relations must adapt to this shift from Western liberalism to 
 
ACM, as it is a new wave
231
. The ASEAN style of cooperation proposed can work with 
 
these types of governments, as has been shown in Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia 
 
as well as Vietnam. The progress is possible and realistic. The realist theoretical 
 
interpretation indicates that each state’s own self-interest would actually drive further 
 
cooperation as each state stands to profit from more effective and efficient 
 
multilateralism. Furthermore, by building on the blueprints developed by the United 
 
States and United Nations, as well as the multitude of regional organizations acting 
 
independently of each other with no real focus or comprehensive end goals, can create 
 
an entirely different strategic outlook for the region, creating a stable Central Asia and 
 
Afghanistan. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
ACM Authoritarian Conflict Management 
 
AF-PAK Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations 
 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization 
CAEC Central Asian Economic Community 
CAF Central Asian Forum 
CANWFZ Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DEA United States Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Agency 
 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
 
EU European Union 
 
FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas [Pakistan] 
IFAS International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
 
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 
 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
 
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
 
UN United Nations 
 
US United States 
 
USAF United States Air Force 
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USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic 
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